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ABSTRACT
Eric Foner has observed that historians of the Thirteenth Amendment have struggled “to find ways to get
the voice of African Americans into discussions of the Amendment’s original meaning, scope, and
limitation.” This article is part of a project to answer Professor Foner’s challenge to recover nineteenthcentury African American constitutionalism. While there are many sources for accessing the views of
African American writers, speakers, and activists, this article focuses on the rich contributions of the Black
Convention Movement. Despite its importance in helping to set the terms for Reconstruction, the Black
Convention Movement and the Black public sphere more generally have been under-utilized and understudied as a part of our constitutional history. The documents from the state and national conventions of
African Americans that took place from 1831 through the 1860s provide evidence of how African
Americans understood constitutional ideals, principles, interpretations, and text in the period of time when
significant constitutional change was about to take place. As we will see, the conventions included debates
and statements about a range of constitutional ideas, from the meaning of freedom in a society infused with
slavery and race prejudice, to complex views about the meaning of national citizenship, to fundamental
questions about the validity and morality of the constitution itself. By the 1860s, as the Civil War revealed
the possibility of an America freed from slavery, African American Conventions began to present a broad
vision of civil society where constitutionally protected freedom and citizenship encompassed everything
from suffrage to employment to property to education. This vision, while shared intermittently by some
white abolitionist allies, was both more insistent and more encompassing than those ideas of freedom most
often articulated in the white public sphere. This vision, I argue, is the lost meaning of African American
constitutionalism and is one well worth exploring as we consider how and whether American
constitutionalism in the twenty-first century can speak to us.
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INTRODUCTION
As we struggle to apply constitutional principles to the challenges of the
twenty-first century, several scholars have recently urged us to look to the
freedom struggles of the nineteenth century to help rethink contemporary
constitutional law. In her powerful article, Abolition Constitutionalism,
Dorothy Roberts argues that a re-engagement with a critical perspective on
contemporary applications of the Reconstruction Amendments as a source for
constitutional tools for prison abolitionism and criminal justice reform.1
According to Roberts, “[t]he abolition struggle profoundly shaped not only the
specific language of the Reconstruction Amendments but also the very
meaning of those constitutional principles.”2 While the dominant versions of
antebellum constitutionalism helped to secure slavery, abolitionism “forged a
radically divergent . . . constitutionalism” and provides an “alternative public

1
2

Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2019).
Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
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meaning of the Constitution” for today’s efforts to reclaim principles of
equality and freedom in constitutional law.3 Several other scholars, including
Rebecca Zietlow, Alexander Tsesis, Lea VanderVelde, and James Gray Pope,
have pressed us to consider the authors and supporters of the Reconstruction
Amendments as framers of the Constitution much as we do with the Founding
era.4
The mining of abolitionist writings has been an important step for
contemporary constitutional scholarship. Nonetheless, as Eric Foner has
observed in discussing the Thirteenth Amendment, historians have struggled
“to find ways to get the voice of African Americans into discussions of the
Amendment’s original meaning, scope, and limitations.”5 This is changing.
The shift is partly evident in the New York Times’s 1619 Project, which seeks
to “place the consequences of slavery and the contributions of [B]lack
Americans at the very center of the story we tell ourselves about who we are
as a country.”6 From the perspective of legal history, historian Martha Jones’
remarkable recent book, Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in
Antebellum America, presents a deeply researched and vibrant exploration of
the legal consciousness, activism, and meaning of African Americans in
antebellum Baltimore, and reclaims ideas of constitutional and democratic
citizenship from the actions and arguments of antebellum African Americans.7
In Jones’ telling, rights for antebellum free Black Baltimoreans were less about
3
4

5
6
7

Id.
Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 393,
393 (2012) (describing how drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment reframed the Constitution as an
antislavery document); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1697 (2012) (demonstrating the antislavery constitutionalist view that slavery
was unconstitutional prior to the Thirteenth Amendment because it violated constitutional provisions
protecting fundamental natural rights); ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 2 (2004) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment
“changed the fundamental structure of U.S. law” by abolishing the “political structure that was linked
to slavery.”); Lea VanderVelde, Henry Wilson: Cobbler of the Frayed Constitution, Strategist of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 174 (2017) (comparing Henry Wilson’s
constitutional import to that of Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race,
and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude ,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474,
1474 (2010) (expanding the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to protect labor rights); KURT T.
LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP 2 (2014) (suggesting that the ultimate goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was “repairing
and reconstructing the United States”).
Eric Foner, Remarks at the Conference on the Second Founding, November 14, 2008, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1289, 1290 (2008).
Jake Silverstein, Why We Published the 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/magazine/1619-intro.html.
MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHTS CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA 13–14 (2018).
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statutes, court opinions, and legal treatises (although those were also relevant)
and more about day-to-day actions and claims—to the rights to travel, own
property, sue in court, bear arms—by people asserting citizenship in the face
of the formal legal denial of that citizenship.8
Jones’ work very intentionally shifts the focus away from constitutional law
to a deeper study of legal consciousness where the law functions within social
and political contexts. While I agree that such a shift is critical, my goal here
is to circle back to a study of what might be described as constitutional
consciousness, if not precisely constitutional law. In this way, I hope we can
connect some of the deeper cultural meanings for the very terms and concepts
that were included in the Reconstruction Constitution. To do this, I examine
another source for constitutional meaning in the antebellum freedom struggle:
the Black Convention Movement. Despite its importance in helping to set the
terms for Reconstruction, the Black Convention Movement and the Black
public sphere more generally have been under-utilized and under-studied as a
part of our constitutional history. The documents from the Black conventions
provide evidence of how African Americans understood constitutional ideals,
principles, interpretations, and text in the period of time when significant
constitutional change was about to take place. The conventions provide
sources for constitutional understandings important for anyone who considers
public meanings relevant to constitutional interpretation. 9
8
9

Id. at 14.
Originalism in particular has stressed evidence of public meaning, but most schools of constitutional
interpretation consider it relevant. See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 380–82 (2013) (highlighting a concise explanation of public meaning
originalism). Evidence from the Black public sphere may be especially helpful for those who are
looking for a range of possible meaning—a floor-and-ceiling approach, if you will—as opposed to a
more unified fixed meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 75 (2015) (discussing how
originalism can set historically understood upper and lower boundaries on meanings of vague
constitutional phrases such as “privileges or immunities”); Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of
Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 91 (2016) (acknowledging that there is often
“dissensus and differing understandings among the ratifying public” but arguing that a “thin” theory
of public meaning that focuses on the most general level of agreement can account for such multiple
meanings); James W. Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 675, 677 (2016) (criticizing originalism for the assumption that there is a singular historical
public on which to base public meaning analysis). I would add here that my own idea of public
meaning assumes historical practices to be particularly relevant and likely to produce divergent and
multiple meanings, and that I see semantic or lexicographic approaches to meaning as not especially
useful or persuasive. But this Article is generally agnostic on these issues; I hope people of different
interpretive views can find value in evidence of what past generations thought about constitutional
text and background constitutional principles. See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the
Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645 (2013) (arguing that a new form of originalism
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This Article approaches the Black Convention Movement as a source of
constitutional meaning and constitutional history. It proceeds roughly
chronologically, focusing on the main themes and key materials and ideas
from each decade of the conventions from 1830 through 1866. With well
over fifty conventions over this period, it is not possible treat them
comprehensively here. Rather, I focus on what I see as some of the key
examples from each period to explicate the main ideas, debates, and interests.
I also view the constitutional issues as developing organically out of the
contexts in which they are raised and discussed. Thus, rather than using
constitutional concepts or text to guide the study of the conventions, I analyze
the debates and documents from the convention and then explore the
constitutional issues emerging from those sources. I should also note that by
focusing on the conventions I am aware that there is much more depth to the
ideas, debates, and practices than I capture here. The vibrant Black press of
this period, which developed in conjunction with and parallel to the
Convention Movement, contained ideas about law and politics that are at least
as significant as those in the conventions, and very often the ideas mentioned
in convention had been argued in the press already and continued to be
debated there after the conventions.10 For similar reasons of scope and focus,
I do not address the connections and disjunctions between Black abolitionism
and white abolitionists. Those connections are critical to getting a sense of the
dynamic across different spheres of discourse and to understanding overlaps
and tensions among various publics during Reconstruction played out at the
time of the drafting and ratifying of the Reconstruction Amendments, and just
for this reason they deserve a separate treatment.
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of the movement itself. Part
II focuses on the inaugural set of conventions, the national conventions from
1830-1835 held in Philadelphia and New York. These conventions helped
form a distinctively African American public sphere as a counterweight to the
increasingly racist and aggressively pro-slavery dominant culture. But they also
revealed some of the limitations of the approach of that leadership generation.
Part III considers some of the conventions that resumed in the 1840s and
continued into the 1850s. This was a very active and vibrant period that saw a
transformation in the Black Public Sphere from a more conciliatory voice seen

10

(“framework originalism”) offers an opportunity to reassess the role of history in constitutional
construction).
See generally DERRICK R. SPIRES, THE PRACTICE OF CITIZENSHIP: BLACK POLITICS AND PRINT
CULTURE IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2019) (exploring the many ways antebellum Black public
culture used print and written cultural productions, including the press, and situating the convention
movement within that print culture).
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in the 1830s to a range of more radical voices, from advocacy of slave rebellion
to the embrace of a Black-led emigrationism, that pressed the Black Public
Spheres in a more activist and radical direction.
In this context
constitutionalism took on a decidedly revolutionary character and set the stage
for the Civil War to become the Second American Revolution. In Part IV,
this Article looks at some of the pivotal convention of the late-Civil War and
early Reconstruction period, the Syracuse National Convention of 1864. In
many ways this convention was the culmination of the decades-long
movement, and many of the ideas expressed were ones that had been refined
in early conventions. But it also reflected a new stage, one where actual legal
and political change was happening and one where Black activism took one a
remarkably coordinated and organizationally sophisticated form through a
network of Equal Rights Leagues and other similar civil society groups.
This Article ends this part of the story here, at the foothills of the new
constitutionalism of Reconstruction. The Convention Movement continued,
but with the creation of the (temporary) biracial democracy under the
Reconstruction Act of 1867, the role of counterpublic structures changed,
diminishing somewhat and refocusing their form and energy. Thus, in Part V,
this Article concludes by surveying the constitutional ideas that developed over
time and helped formed the constitutional milieu of Reconstruction. The
conclusions here are more suggestive than definitive, indicating a need for
further study but also the result of the more open-natured, rhetorical, and nonlegal character of the materials themselves. Indeed, as we will see, it was an
important aspect of African American constitutionalism that it be an open and
regenerative process. Antebellum Black constitutionalism was at once a
deeply critical project and an impressively hopeful one, both immanent
critique and aspirational constitutionalism. It pointed to directions for
realizing a society of full, rather than nominal, freedom and a culture of
equality across all of civil and political society. Such goals were—and still are—
suggestive and ephemeral but attending to the experiences and words of
antebellum African Americans, whether through the Black Convention
Movement or in other ways, can help us think more deeply about what those
ideals meant and can mean.
I.

BLACK CONVENTION MOVEMENT: AN OVERVIEW

Beginning with meetings organized in Philadelphia in 1830 and 1831, the
Black Convention Movement provided a forum for African Americans in the
North to oppose slavery and protect and develop their own interests as free
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people of color in an increasingly hostile North.11 Although the Movement
was closely linked to the growing interracial abolitionist movement—white
abolitionists attended and spoke at the meetings and William Garrison’s
Liberator often published their more prominent speeches and documents—
the conventions and their publications were organized and run by African
Americans in order to address problems and ideas that white abolitionism
sometimes ignored or minimized.12 Perhaps because of this, the conventions
were by no means solely about abolition; they also provided forums for
discussion of racial prejudice in the North and explorations of what freedom
meant, in theory and in practice, to free Black people.13 They also were a

11

12

13

See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865, at xi (Philip S. Foner &
George E. Walker eds., 1979) (illustrating the utility of organizing at a national level in the face of the
continued enforcement of Black Laws); MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
NEGRO CONVENTIONS, 1830–1864, at ii (Howard Holman Bell ed., 1969) (describing national
conventions motivated by the desire promote education, employment, and equal access to courts);
Howard Holman Bell, A Survey of the Negro Convention Movement, 1830–1861 (June 1953)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (ProQuest) (pioneering survey of the national
convention movement); JOHN ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION: ORGANIZING AFRICANAMERICAN COMMUNITIES BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 107–138 (2011) [hereinafter ERNEST, A
NATION WITHIN A NATION] (discussing the Black Convention Movement from 1830–1864));
JOHN ERNEST, LIBERATION HISTORIOGRAPHY: AFRICAN AMERICAN WRITERS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HISTORY, 1794–1861, at 221 (2004) [hereinafter “ERNEST, LIBERATION
HISTORIOGRAPHY”](exploring how African American writers developed their own historiography
that focused on their own interests); EDDIE S. GLAUDE, JR., EXODUS!: RELIGION, RACE, AND
NATION IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY BLACK AMERICA 113 (2000) (noting that racial terror
in northern states sparked the call for national conventions). A truly remarkable resource for the
study of the convention movement has been compiled by the Colored Convention Project and is
available at http://coloredconventions.org/. Based on the research compiled by the Project, there
were well over 100 national, regional, and state conventions held in the period from 1830–1875, and
while not all produce extensive materials that are still available, there is a sizable collection of
convention documents from this period. All of the conventions cited in this Article can be found at
the Project’s website. Scholars at the Project currently have a book of essays in progress on the
movement that should prove a pathbreaking addition to the scholarship on this important area. See
THE COLORED CONVENTIONS MOVEMENT: BLACK ORGANIZING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (P. Gabrielle Foreman, Jim Casey & Sarah Lynn Patterson, eds., 2021).
John Ernest captures this point nicely when he says that Black northerners felt that “white abolitionists
were more concerned about the sins of slavery than about those who suffered the force of those sins,
and more concerned with abstract freedom than with the recognition of humanity and fundamental
equality that gave the concept of freedom meaning and purpose.” ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A
NATION, supra note 11, at 118–19.
See P. Gabrielle Foreman, The Colored Conventions Project and the Changing Same, COMMON
PLACE (Fall 2015), http://commonplace.online/article/the-colored-conventions-project-and-thechanging-same/ (“[Convention] representatives considered resolutions to advance educational and
labor rights, voting and jury representation and the role of the Black press. They debated the utility
of jobs in the service sector, the power of owning one’s own land and businesses, and how to best
support the self-emancipated, the still enslaved and the newly freed. They gathered and disseminated
data about Black occupations, property and institutional affiliations.”).
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source for developing ideas of social uplift and moral reform. In short, the
state and national conventions addressed “the need to provide African
Americans with uplift while countering the white community’s assumptions of
[B]lack inferiority.”14 The shifting themes of the conventions, and the debates
they enabled, showed the need and value in having a primarily African
American forum for these discussions. In a society where white people not
only dominated political and cultural fora but formally and informally
excluded Black people from participation, the Convention Movement
provided a space, or countersphere, for public engagement by African
Americans. It was a key component, along with the Black press and Black
church, of the Black public sphere that was critical to African American
resistance and development.15
The Convention Movement went through phases of development from its
inception in the 1830s through Reconstruction. It began as a counter to the
powerful American Colonization Society (“ACS”), an organization run by
white elites, most of whom opposed abolition and sought to move free Black
people to Liberia.16 This early phase briefly considered Black-led alternatives
to the ACS, such as the movement to build Black communities in what was
then known as Upper Canada, but turned instead to a focus on moral
improvement movements (similar to those advanced by Garrisonians) such as
temperance, education, and benevolence societies.17 As we shall see, they also
began articulating a form of constitutionalism that would develop over the next
thirty years. As enthusiasm for the national conventions waned, perhaps in
part because of the financial and logistical difficulties following the national
economic collapse produced by the panic of 1837, the focus shifted to a series
of state conventions that were both logistically easier and offered the
opportunity to address more specific concerns, like opposition to state-based

14
15
16

17

ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 118. Eddie Glaude describes this as the
“outside-and-inside” dynamic of the Convention Movement. GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 114.
On the context of the convention movement within Black activism and activist organizations
generally, see ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 108–09.
See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 105–25
(2014) (discussing the ACS’s efforts to colonize Liberia and the inherent problems of a settler society
it produced in Liberia); MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 239–
40 (2016) (discussing opposition of many within the ACS to abolition and anti-slavery).
JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, THEY WHO WOULD BE FREE: BLACKS’ SEARCH FOR
FREEDOM, 1830–1861, at 119–21 (1974) (describing the decline in popularity of Canadian
emigration within the Black public sphere from being a “major project” to “a barely preferable
alternative to the detested Liberian program of the American Colonization Society”); GLAUDE, supra
note 11, at 115–17 (emphasizing that the shortcomings presented by Canadian emigration gave way
by 1832 to moral and mental improvement efforts).
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suffrage and civil rights restrictions.18 Through the 1840s and 1850s,
intermittent national conventions, combined with a series of state conventions,
reflected the variety of concerns, debates, and ideas circulating within the
Black public sphere in the north. A recurrent theme of the conventions was
the range of efforts Black communities could employ to battle what seemed a
hardening of white supremacy in the north and west and the parallel efforts to
support African American social, political, and economic uplift.19 As one
convention put it in 1855, “the work of elevation of the Free People of Color
is (so to speak) the lever by which the whole must rise, that work must now
receive a vigorous and hearty support from all of those upon whom it has a
claim.”20 According to historians Jane and William Pease, the conventions
were key to the Black abolitionist and civil rights movement, and “[m]uch if
not all self-consciously [B]lack antislavery and civil rights activity either shaped
or was shaped by this central institution.”21
The conventions also served as a form of community-building and
organization, especially for states where the Black population was small and
widely dispersed. As J. B. Sanderson, one of the leaders of the California state
convention, put it:
We are scattered over the State in small numbers; the laws scarcely
recognizing us; public sentiment is prejudiced against us; we are
misunderstood, and misrepresented; it was needful that we should
meet, communicate, and confer with each other upon some plan of
representing our interests before the people of California.22
Of course, doing so presented a range of difficulties, as the conventions
were both forums for debate and efforts to find a unified voice. Debate, if too
heated, could undermine the project; unity, if falsely obtained, could render
the conventions chimerical. This delicate balance was often achieved, and the
records of the conventions present evidence both of points of unity and the
ranges and topics of disagreement.
As the decades progressed, the state and national conventions became
more militant. Howard Bell describes the 1850s as a decade of both “growing
18

19
20

21
22

ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 111–12; see also PATRICK RAEL, BLACK
IDENTITY AND BLACK PROTEST IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH 31 (2002) (noting the difficulty of
holding national conventions).
ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 118-19.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLORED NATIONAL CONVENTION, HELD IN FRANKLIN HALL, SIXTH
STREET, BELOW ARCH, PHILADELPHIA, OCTOBER 16TH, 17TH AND 18TH, 1855, at 4 (1856); see
also ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 119 (quoting the Proceedings of the
Colored National Convention in 1855).
PEASE & PEASE, supra note 17, at 123.
ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 113.
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militancy” and a renewed consideration of Black-led emigration.23 Especially
after the Compromise of 1850 established a federal regime of support for
kidnapping of northern Black Americans under the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, the calls by people such as Henry Garnet for forceful resistance swelled,
and the need for political activism persuaded many Black abolitionists to
abandon Garrisonianism. By the eve of the Civil War, with the “slaveocracy”
apparently in significant control of the courts (Dred Scott) and legislature (the
Kansas-Nebraska Act and the opening of new territory to slavery), even longtime opponents of emigration like Frederick Douglass and William Wells
Brown had moved to the emigration camp, and it appeared the convention
movement might have reached an end.
The war changed everything. With Abraham Lincoln’s reluctant but
significant embrace of the end of slavery as a war goal and the grudging
acceptance of Black men into the military, Black militantism had not only
overcome emigrationism but had become the cause of the Union.24 With the
pivotal National Convention of 1864 in Syracuse, the convention movement
grew into a full-blown social movement, helping to create a national
organization with local and state memberships, which in turn supported and
inspired state and local conventions.25 Because of the base established at the
state and national levels before the war, African American leaders and
communities were able to organize quickly and effectively to develop a
counterpublic civil society that actually saw some hopes for repairing the social
rift that made them counterpublics in the first place. The post-war conventions
allowed for expressions of principles and concerns of particular import for
Black Americans as they confronted the possibilities and problems of
Reconstruction. They also provide us with an important source for the
culmination of decades of development of ideas and practices of
constitutionalism and democratic citizenship and an expression of the possible
direction for a new vision of American citizenship based on equality and

23

24

25

Bell, supra note 11, at 111. For example, Bell notes that the 1849 Ohio Convention supported
distribution of David Walker’s Appeal and Henry Garnet’s Address to the Slaves, perhaps the
leading written calls for forceful and violent resistance to slavery. Id. at 115.
See John David Smith, Let Us All Be Grateful That We Have Colored Troops That Will Fight, in
BLACK SOLDIERS IN BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (John David
Smith, ed.) 1–78 (2002) (discussing the background and effects of Lincoln’s decision to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation and incorporate Black soldiers into the Union army).
DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: A BRIEF, VIOLENT HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 186–88 (2014) (describing the spread of Syracuse convention
attendees to Richmond, New Orleans, and the District of Columbia); see Eric Foner, Rights and the
Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War and Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 866–67
(1987) (highlighting the National Black Convention in Syracuse).
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liberty.26 They give us views of the meaning of equality and freedom by the
Americans who most deeply understood those words precisely because of the
fact of their denial, and who especially understood both the difficulties
inherent in realizing the ideals and the important potential for a society if it
would fully commit to the them.
The conventions provide us a window into the opinions and ideas of some
of the most important Black leaders and communities throughout the nation
from this period. With the establishment of the Equal Rights Leagues and the
eventual political participation of Black people across the country in the
second half of the 1860s, a remarkable number of African Americans worked
to try to build an equal and free society and create an American citizenship
worthy of that name. They did so in public forums, where they disagreed,
argued, debated, compromised, and eventually created documents addressed
to both Black citizens and to white politicians. And in many instances those
documents, discussions, and debates extended deep into local communities
with the networks built through the Equal Rights Leagues. For all of these
reasons, the Black Convention Movement is an important source for us to
access ideas within the Black public sphere, ideas which speak to the very
foundations of what we today consider to be the most valuable and salient
aspects of our constitution and constitutional culture: freedom, equality, and
citizenship.
II. FORMATION OF A BLACK PUBLIC: THE 1830S NATIONAL
CONVENTIONS
The Black Convention Movement began in 1830 with a meeting in
Philadelphia organized by Hezekiah Grice of Baltimore and Bishop Richard
Allen, the then-aged founder of the AME Church, and other East Coast Black
leaders.27 Five of the six meetings from 1830 to 1835 took place in

26

27

For an excellent recent study of how antebellum Black writers and activists explored and created
meanings of citizenship, see SPIRES, supra note 10. In particular, Spires seeks to avoid reading Blackauthored texts as merely a reaction to white culture and politics and instead “base our working
definition of citizenship on [B]lack writers’ texts written explicitly to and for [B]lack communities[.]”
Id. at 2; see also ANDREW K. DIEMER, THE POLITICS OF BLACK CITIZENSHIP: FREE AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC BORDERLAND, 1817-1863, at 5–8 (2016) (illuminating African
Americans’ struggles for the rights of citizenship and challenging existing scholarship that depicted
the antebellum decades as a period of withdrawal responding to rising white prejudice). These works
nicely complement Martha Jones’s work on African American citizenship claiming in antebellum
Baltimore. See JONES, supra note 7.
PEASE & PEASE, supra note 17, at 119–121.
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Philadelphia, with the fifth being held in New York in 1834.28 Although each
convention aspired to be national, and some delegates did attend from as far
away as Cincinnati, these were decidedly Mid-Atlantic gatherings.
Nevertheless, the conventions provided a means for free Black people to
begin constructing a national identity, and the debates at these conventions
reflected this effort. This was evident in the initial conventions, which focused
heavily on two conflicting topics, emigration and colonization. Indeed, the
first few conventions revolved around the effort to define and negotiate a space
in the Black public that supported some Black-led emigration yet also
forcefully rejected the very well-funded and widely known white-led efforts to
move free Black people to Liberia. In addressing these twin topics, the
convention delegates asserted and created their own identity as America
citizens, including their relationship to the nation and its Constitution.
The question of emigration had arisen with special urgency for Black
Ohioans when, in 1829, cities and towns like Cincinnati began aggressively
enforcing anti-Black laws and white residents launched violent riots against the
growing Black population.29 Some African Americans from Ohio began
emigrating to the largely unpopulated areas of Upper Canada (outside York,
now Toronto), founding the community of Wilberforce.30 The necessity of
aiding the Ohio emigrants and refugees and expressing public outrage over
anti-Black laws and white Cincinnati’s use of the laws to force Black residents
to leave their native homes was a main impetus for holding the first
meeting/convention in 1830.31
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Id.; Bell, supra note 11, at 17–18
GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 112–13.
JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, IN HOPE OF LIBERTY: CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND
PROTEST AMONG NORTHERN FREE BLACKS, 1700–1860, at 104 (1997); SINHA, supra note 16, at
207–08. Nearly 2000 Black residents were forced out of Cincinnati. See NIKKI M. TAYLOR,
FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI’S BLACK COMMUNITY, 1802–1868, at 20 (2005) (showing
in table 1.1 the decline in the city’s Black population from 2,258 in 1829 to 1,090 in 1830). On the
1829 riots and emigration to Canada generally, see id. at 50–79.
See SINHA, supra note 16, at 208 (“In response to the Cincinnati riot and to foster Canadian
emigration, African Americans convened a national convention in 1830.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF FREE PERSONS OF COLOUR, FOR IMPROVING THEIR CONDITION IN THE
UNITED STATES; FOR PURCHASING LANDS; AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SETTLEMENT IN
UPPER CANADA, ALSO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION WITH THEIR ADDRESS TO FREE
PERSONS OF COLOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1831) [hereinafter 1830 National Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/f82c27cba074be4e09cd1aadb5aadcd1.pdf
(stating that the convention was convened in consideration of the anxiety caused by laws of Ohio
abridging the liberties and privileges of free people of color denying them a right of residence unless
they comply with requisitions not required of white people); MINUTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION, FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR IN
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At the same time that the Ohio incidents and emigration were taking place,
the American Colonization Society had become a major force nationally and
was actively recruiting free Black people to move to the new colony of Liberia.
The ACS had formed after the War of 1812, and had the support of many
leading white politicians.32 One of the most important functions that the
delegates and organizers of the first wave of Black conventions assumed was
the forceful condemnation of this white-led colonization, which they saw as
fundamentally pro-slavery and anti-Black. The work of the early Black
conventions, along with the individual advocacy of Black leaders, to confront
colonization firmly and uniformly helped convince white abolitionists,
including William Lloyd Garrison and Arthur and Lewis Tappan, to oppose
the ACS.33
The Address of the 1830 Convention declared that “we who have been
born and nurtured on this soil, we whose habits, manners, and customs are
the same in common with other Americans, can never consent” to removal to
the distant land and climate of Africa.34 The following year the 1831
Convention likewise asserted nativity and citizenship to contest colonization:
[T]hey [the ACS] are pursuing the direct road to perpetuate slavery, with all
its unchristianlike concomitants, in this boasted land of freedom; and, as
citizens and men whose best blood is sapped to gain popularity for that
UNITED STATES, HELD BY ADJOURNMENTS IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, FROM THE
4TH TO THE 13TH OF JUNE INCLUSIVE, 1832, at
16–20
[hereinafter
1832 National Convention], https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/8d604da70a1c2f01
ad867bbd5dcefd88.pdf (summarizing, in the Committee Report on Canada, the efforts to investigate,
fund, and assist emigration to Upper Canada and the difficulties involved, including hostility of local
white Canadians); Nikki Taylor, Reconsidering the “Forced” Exodus of 1829: Free Black Emigration
from Cincinnati, Ohio to Wilberforce, Canada, 87 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 283, 283 (2002) (discussing the
African American exodus from Cincinnati). Taylor distinguishes between those who voluntarily
emigrated to Canada and those true refugees who were forced out of Cincinnati by the riots, many
of whom settled in nearby towns. Id. The members of the National Conventions were concerned
about both groups.
DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW
WORLD 256–58 (2006) [hereinafter, DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE]. On the complexities involved
in the colonization movement across white and Black abolitionists, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE
PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 144–92 (2014) [hereinafter DAVIS, THE
PROBLEM OF SLAVERY]. See also SINHA, supra note 16, at 160–82, 203–05 (discussing the ACS
and the responses of African Americans, and exploring the relationship between emigrationism and
colonization and the experiences of African American settlers in Liberia).
See DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY, supra note 32, at 185–92 (describing the influence of Black
abolitionist leaders on important white reformers such as William Lloyd Garrison and Arthur
Tappan); SINHA, supra note 16, at 214–21 (discussing the influence of Black anti-colonizationist
activists on Garrison); DAVID E. SWIFT, BLACK PROPHETS OF JUSTICE: ACTIVIST CLERGY BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 72–74 (1989) (discussing the influence of Black leaders such as Samuel Cornish
and Theodore Wright on leading white abolitionists such as the Tappans and Gerrit Smith).
1830 National Convention, supra note 31, at 10.
THESE
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Institution, we would, in the most feeling manner, beg of them to desist: or, if
we must be sacrificed to their philanthropy, we would rather die at home.
Many of our fathers, and some of us, have fought and bled for the liberty,
independence, and peace which you now enjoy; and, surely, it would be
ungenerous and unfeeling in you to deny us an humble and quiet grave in that
country which gave us birth!
35

The 1831 Convention here asserted their position clearly, but, compared
to subsequent conventions, somewhat tamely. By 1832 the Convention
delegates felt more emboldened. Black activists had convinced some white
abolitionists of the dangers of colonization and had recruited them to the anticolonization and anti-ACS cause. It may have been that the movement of
some white abolitionists to their side on the colonization issue meant the
delegates felt less of a need to gently persuade anti-slavery members of the
ACS and made it easier to, as they put it, assert their position more firmly.
The 1832 Convention invited Garrison to debate, at the convention, with a
representative of the ACS, and Garrison clearly had the ears and support of
the delegates. The Convention concluded that:
[W]e do now assert, that the result of the same [the debate between Garrison
and Gurley for the ACS] has tended more deeply to rivet our solid conviction,
that the doctrines of said Society, are at enmity with the principles and
precepts of religion, humanity and justice, and should be regarded by every
man of color in these United States, as an evil for magnitude, unexcelled, and
whose doctrines aim at the entire extinction of the free colored population
and the riviting [sic] of Slavery.
36

In taking such a strong stand against the ACS, the 1832 Convention also
found it necessary to explain their simultaneous support for emigrationists
going to Canada. Indeed, in confronting this delicate negotiation between
opposition to colonization and support for emigration, the early conventions
began a debate and dialogue that would be a central aspect of the Black public
sphere throughout the antebellum period, and again, in somewhat different

35

36

MINUTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF COLOUR,
HELD BY ADJOURNMENTS IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, FROM THE SIXTH TO THE ELEVENTH
OF JUNE, INCLUSIVE, 1831, at 15 (1831) [hereinafter 1831 National Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/558d4609932ce29fb9c44d1409344e98.pdf.
1832 National Convention, supra note 31, at 33. The position was reiterated forcefully in 1833 as
also reflecting the position of delegates from each state, emphasizing the widespread opposition to
colonization. MINUTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION, FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR IN THESE UNITED STATES, HELD BY
ADJOURNMENTS IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, FROM THE 3D TO THE 13TH OF JUNE
INCLUSIVE,
1833, at 26– 28 (1833) [hereinafter 1833 National Convention], https://omeka.coloredconventions.o
rg/files/original/51f074b1e438eee53b1a30fd296b63a7.pdf.
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form, after Reconstruction.37 The Convention’s answer was two-fold. First, it
made clear that colonization was an effort by white Americans to force Black
Americans to leave, against their will and to a place not of their choosing,
whereas emigration was a decision made and implemented by African
Americans themselves. In this respect colonization was another form of
oppression and subordination; emigration was an exercise of liberty, albeit
within the limited range of free choices available to Black People in the North.
Second, the Convention stressed that emigration was a last resort, forced on
emigrants by the “expulsory” laws of Ohio being enforced brutally in
Cincinnati. As they put it, emigration to Canada was “a refuge in a storm”
required by “the law of necessity” to protect the victims of white violence and
legal proscription, but their support for the emigrants did not lessen their
“noble sentiment which we rejoice in exclaiming—This is our own/Our native
land.”38 It remained the delegates’ firm belief that that their efforts at
advocating for fellow Black citizens, and at seeking paths to improvement of
free Black Americans, were the focus of their communal efforts.
In claiming a right of nativity, the convention delegates were redefining
American citizenship to include Black Americans. This point is also seen in
how the conventions addressed their public statements to “Fellow Citizens.”39

37

38
39

As Martha Jones explains, “[t]he line between colonization and emigration was real, distinguishing
self-determination from compulsion.” JONES, supra note 7, at 38. Jones nicely depicts how debates
within the Black community of antebellum Baltimore over colonization and emigration were an
important aspect of the development of African American ideas of belonging and citizenship. See
also Taylor, supra note 31, at 287–88 (emphasizing that self-determination was the key difference
between emigration and white-controlled colonization projects).
1832 National Convention, supra note 31, at 33–34.
See, e.g., 1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 12 (beginning the conventional address with
the salutation “Respected Bretheren and Fellow Citizens”); 1832 National Convention, supra note
31, at 32 (beginning the conventional address with the salutation “Fellow Citizens”); 1833
Convention, supra note 36, at 31 (beginning the conventional address with the salutation “Bretheren
and Fellow Citizens”); MINUTES OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT
OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR IN THE UNITED STATES, HELD BY ADJOURNMENTS, IN THE
WESLEY CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA, FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTH OF JUNE, INCLUSIVE, 1835, at
25
(1835)
[hereinafter
1835
National
Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/9c82e209c1203b531321aa2c241d42dd.pdf
(beginning their address to the American people with the salutation “Fellow Citizens”). The 1830
meeting used only the term “Brethren.” 1830 National Convention, supra note 31, at 9. The 1834
Convention issued a “Declaration of Sentiment” rather than an address to the public. MINUTES OF
THE FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION, FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF
COLOUR, IN THE UNITED STATES, HELD BY ADJOURNMENTS IN THE ASBURY CHURCH, NEWYORK, FROM THE 2D TO THE 12TH OF JUNE, INCLUSIVE, 1834, at 27 (1834) [hereinafter
1834 National Convention], https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/4be5b059de7e3ab
811082ebd5de89309.pdf.
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As David Walker had done the year before in his groundbreaking Appeal,40
the Convention delegates made a claim to their own equal and full citizenship,
and that of their Black audience, from the very first words of their Addresses.
This was a radical claim, and central to constitutional identity. Citizenship was
a contested space for Black Americans from the very beginning of the nation.
The Constitution was maddeningly vague about who was a citizen and what
that status entailed. In Article IV, Section 2 it asserted a protection across state
lines for citizens in clause 1, but in clause 3 made clear that those “held to
service or labor” would be returned to their owners and receive no protections
from the hosting state. The ambivalence this created about Black citizenship
came to a head in the battle over the admission of Missouri from 1819-1821,
with Missouri attempting to deny free African Americans travel to and
residence in the state (an issue on which Congress basically punted).41 The
Naturalization Act of 1790 barred non-white immigrants from naturalized
citizenship.42 State-level citizenship status varied widely, but the prominent
markers of full citizenship—suffrage, rights of residence, right to testify, etc.—
were denied or restricted to free Black people (and of course to those who
were enslaved ) in many states. In this context, the assertion of full citizenship
in public forums and documents was a bold exclamation of membership that
white America, by law and social custom, generally denied.
The claim of citizenship also reflected the assertion of a national status
(national citizenship was not embraced in the Constitution until 1868). The
convention movement—like the Black press, Black churches, and a
community of Black writers, speakers, and their audiences—was an early
expression of nationalism and national identity, and reflected an increasing

40
41

42

See DAVID WALKER’S APPEAL TO THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD (Peter P. Hinks ed.,
2000) (reprinting David Walker’s 1829 original work).
See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 312–14
(1978) (discussing the Missouri compromise and the role it played in the discourse surrounding Black
citizenship). Congress permitted Missouri to retain the racial exclusion in its constitution but
simultaneously declared that the state would not pass any law violating the federal Constitution
(leaving open the issue of whether the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibited
the state’s race-based migration ban). See Sean Wilentz, Jeffersonian Democracy and the Origins of
Political Antislavery in the United States: The Missouri Crisis Revisited, 4 J. HIST. SOC’Y 375, 382
(2004) (“Clay brokered a deal that let the Missouri constitution stand—but with the perverse proviso
that the state legislature would pass no law at variance with the Constitution.” (citation omitted)).
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, Ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. (repealed 1795) (“[A]ny alien, being a free white person,
who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term
of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof[.]”).
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importance of an American identity based on national communities.43 The
conventions helped create and develop a free Black community that was
united in and could identify by common interests, and that community crossed
local and state lines. Indeed, with so many northern and western states
enforcing and expanding legal segregation, national community building was
an essential counterweight to state and local oppression.44 And, for free Black
people, many of whom had themselves recently escaped slavery, the identity
of interest extended to all free and enslaved African Americans. To some
extent it also extended to all people of African descent, whether in Africa or
across the diaspora, and an international awareness was never far from the
consciousness of speakers and writers in the American Black public sphere.45
But in the conventions, as in David Walker’s Appeal, the focus remained on
the problem of slavery and prejudice in the United States. Thus the 1831
Convention declared that “Our attention has been called to investigate the
political standing of our brethren wherever dispersed, but more particularly
the situation of those in this great Republic.”46
This national identity was an important aspect of the constitutional identity
that was emerging in the Black public sphere as well. The 1831 Convention
asserted their membership and status as American citizens with a full embrace
of the nation’s founding documents. The convention’s main committee
recommended “that the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the
United States, be read in our Conventions; believing, that the truths contained
43

44

45

46

ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 120–22 (noting that the conventions
played an important role in creating a national community to deal with national evils); see also RAEL,
supra note 18, at 47 (remarking on the discursive process through which African Americans created
a national family). There was also a parallel establishment of the Colored American Conventional
Temperance Society with branches in 18 cities, that also advocated for Black rights and moral uplift.
See SINHA, supra note 16, at 300.
See ERNEST, supra note 11, at 107–38 (noting that the conventions were often organized specifically
to address local or regional concerns). For a classic work on segregation in the antebellum north, see
LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961).
See also HORTON & HORTON, supra note 30, at 155–76 (describing anti-African American mob
violence in the East and Midwest).
Antebellum Black Americans’ relationship to Africa and the Diaspora was complex and variable,
and often reflected and helped define their own identities as Americans. See, e.g., LESLIE M.
ALEXANDER, AFRICAN OR AMERICAN? BLACK IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1784-1861 (2008) (discussing the ways in which Black New Yorkers infused their
political activism with pride in their African heritage and wrestled with the difficulty of balancing that
identity with a growing desire for freedom and equality in the United States).
1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 12. David Walker’s Appeal, in its full title, indicated
the same concern with internationalism and focus on the United States. DAVID WALKER’S APPEAL
TO THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD, supra note 40. The 1831 Convention also used the
comparisons to other countries, like Britain and Denmark, to criticize the United States for its failure
to end or curtail slavery. 1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 12.
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in the former are incontrovertible, and that the latter guarantees in letter and
spirit to every freeman born in this country, all the rights and immunities of
citizenship.”47 This statement suggests several important aspects of the
evolving constitutionalism within the Black public sphere (and one that would
increasingly be shared by white abolitionists, in large part because of the
influence of Black abolitionism). It sees the Declaration and the Constitution
as twin foundational supports for American citizenship: the Declaration for its
the incontrovertible truths of equality and of rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness as natural rights for all people, and the Constitution for
the legal and political guarantee of these as rights and immunities of
citizenship. This suggests several interpretive principles. First, the
Constitution does in fact protect a national set of substantive rights and
privileges that were linked to fundamental natural rights—a position at odds
with the dominant understanding of Article IV or any other aspect of the
antebellum Constitution.48
Second, those rights and privileges are
fundamentally grounded in the Declaration’s embrace of equality and rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: the Constitution implements the
Declaration through the guaranty of national citizenship rights and privileges.
Third, the Constitution should be read in both “letter and spirit”, that it is
properly interpreted both textually, in the way we today think of text, and
ideationally, that is, from a base set of principles that animate the text. This
“letter and spirit” approach was, for the convention delegates, entirely
consonant with, and perhaps even necessary for, their view of the rights and
privileges of citizenship and the connections between the Declaration and the
Constitution.49

47
48

49

1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 4–5.
See LASH, supra note 4, at 20–66 (arguing that Article IV was most commonly understood to protect
state-base privileges, which may have included rights that some considered fundamental but were still
exclusively governed by state governments, and that distinctly national privileges encompassed only
those rights and privileges enumerated in the Constitution, such as the right for each state to have two
senators).
See 1834 National Convention, supra note 39, at 29–30 (embracing the Declaration of Independence
as a source for antislavery and “the elevation of the free coloured man to the privileges of
citizenship[,]” thus linking the Declaration explicitly to ideas of constitutional citizenship); Randy E.
Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1, 31–32 (2018) (explaining the idea that legal interpretation encompassed both the letter of the
law and the spirit of the law was common in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century legal
thought). Barnett and Bernick argue that that antebellum courts resorted to the “spirit” of the law
only in cases of textual ambiguity. Id. Regardless of whether that is correct as a history of judicial
method, the reference to “letter and spirit” in the 1831 convention appears to be much broader,
seeking to expand legal meaning beyond generally accepted ideas of formal citizenship to incorporate
deeper principles of equality and rights. Id.
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The convention committee then explicated these ideas:
Your Committee with regret have witnessed the many oppressive, unjust and
unconstitutional laws, which have been enacted in different parts of the Union,
against the free people of colour, and they would call upon this convention as
possessing the rights of freemen, to recommend to the people through their
delegation, the propriety of memorializing the proper authorities, whenever
they may feel themselves aggrieved, or their rights invaded, by any cruel or
oppressive laws.
50

Here a national constitutionalism is being asserted as a trump over racially
oppressive state and local laws. As mentioned above, the Convention was
especially concerned about the Ohio anti-Black laws, but this passage makes
clear that all Jim Crow laws were seen to violate the basic rights of freemen.
Those laws, the committee and convention argued, were not judged against
state constitutions but were measured against a national constitutionalism that
implemented the foundational principles of the Declaration, and which,
according to the delegates, protected freemen’s rights as rights and privileges
of citizenship. This view of the Constitution as a trump on questions of
citizenship rights did not fit the generally accepted idea of federalism of the
time (although it was not until 1833 that the Supreme Court declared that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states).51 It was, rather, a dissenting, critical
interpretation, a form of counterpublic constitutionalism that would deeply
affect the post-war rewriting of the Constitution and federal law.
Black abolitionists at the 1830 and 1831 Conventions were just beginning
to explore the full nature and effect of these ideas. In their opposition to
Ohio’s segregation laws, the 1830 Convention contrasted the benefits of
Canada over Ohio, declaring that “no invidious distinction of colour is
recognised [in Canada], but there we shall be entitled to all the rights,
privileges, and immunities of other citizens.”52 Here we see what was likely
one of the earliest published uses of the term “invidious distinction” to refer
to racial discrimination, a concept that would become a staple of twentiethcentury civil rights law.53 By using this phrase, the convention pointedly
50

51
52
53

1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 5; see id. at 12 (highlighting a similar point in the
convention’s Address, specifically, that “[l]aws, as cruel in themselves as they were unconstitutional
and unjust, have in many places been enacted against our poor unfriended and unoffending
brethren”).
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
1830 National Convention, supra note 31, at 10.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”
(citation omitted)); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (“While a State has broad power when
it comes to making classifications, it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination
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expressed the inherently unjust nature of racial subordination. By connecting
invidious racial distinctions with claims of the “rights, privileges, and
immunities” of citizenship, the convention joined the concepts of citizenship
and equality in a way that anticipated the work of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This connection made plain that the convention members were
not advocating merely for non-discriminatory treatment, but that full equality
involved access to a set of basic rights and privileges inherent in citizenship.
We can also see this concern with the substantive aspects of citizenship in
the 1831 Convention’s support for African American educational institutions.
The Convention advanced efforts to fund and support Arthur Tappan and
William Garrison in the establishment of a college for Black men in the
mechanical arts. This reflected both a commitment to education as a core
privilege of citizenship and also a recognition that the systematic exclusion of
Black citizens from education was a fundamental denial of equality. For the
convention members, the attainment of the communal standards of education,
or, as they put it, access to “those sources of knowledge which abound in
civilized and enlightened communities” was essential for equal citizenship, and
racial prejudice had denied many free Black people such privileges.54 This
advocacy for education extended as well to schools for girls, which the 1833
Convention in particular supported.55 The denial of education was especially
galling because uplift ideology viewed education as one of the primary means
with which African Americans could fight race prejudice.56
In addition to support for education, the 1830s Conventions also
supported some version of a right to property ownership. In their advocacy
for emigration to Canada, the conventions stressed the acquisition of land by

54

55

56

against a particular class.” (citations omitted)); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966) (holding that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause when it fixes voter qualifications
which “invidiously discriminate”); Kenneth L. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and
the Return of the “Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula,” 16 UCLA L. REV. 716 (1969) (discussing the
expansion of the meaning of “invidious discrimination”).
1831 National Convention, supra note 35, at 14–15; see 1832 National Convention, supra note 31,
at 34 (discussing the need to reject New Haven as a location for the college because of white prejudice,
referred to the need to find a place where the “inhabitants are less prejudiced to our rights and
privileges”). See generally James Brewer Stewart, The New Haven Negro College and the Meanings
of Race in New England, 1776-1870, 76 NEW ENG. Q. 323 (2003) (exploring the history of the failed
attempt to found a college for Black students in New Haven, the racist opposition to the college, and
the dynamics of race in New England at the time).
1833 National Convention, supra note 36, at 21, 27, 33 (noting in particular the white resistance that
closed Prudence Crandall’s school for girls that year which the Crandall case became a cause célèbre
for abolitionists); see SINHA, supra note 16, at 229–31 (emphasizing the support for expanding Black
education).
E.g., 1832 National Convention, supra note 31, at 34.
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emigrants and combatting the legal barriers in Canada to land transfer and
ownership.57 The emigration issue thus implied that access to land and
property, as well as rights of residence and travel, were core rights of freemen.
Similarly, in their continued opposition to colonization the conventions
stressed the importance of birthright citizenship as a basis for recognizing their
“natural, civil, and political rights.”58 Notably, this statement included political
rights within the ambit of basic citizenship rights, a point that would remain
contested among white Republicans even during Reconstruction.59
The colonization arguments of the ACS and its supporters pressed the
conventions to define their own identity as Americans, to assert both their
nativity and the rights and privileges to which such natural citizenship entitled
them. By 1834 the conventions were developing a broader plan to address
segregation, highlighting exclusions from religion and churches, segregated
travel on steamboats and stagecoaches, exclusions from skilled education
(“mechanical arts”), and the monitoring of state legislation for new laws
restricting “the rights and liberties of coloured citizens” and devising strategies
to lobby against and challenge such laws.60 The 1835 Convention similarly
encouraged free Black people across the country to petition congress and state
legislatures “to be admitted to the rights and privileges of American citizens,
and that we be protected in the same[,]” reaffirming that their rights and
privileges to full access to civil society were claims of a national citizenship.61
Importantly, the Convention also added protection as one of the central
obligations of government, something felt keenly in 1835, as we see below.62
The conventions also reflected a detailed understanding of race prejudice
acting across multiple social spheres and of how that prejudice caused the
denial of basic rights and privileges of free Black people.63 The conventions

57
58
59

60
61
62

63

Id. at 18–20.
1833 National Convention, supra note 36, at 34.
See LASH, supra note 4, at 24–29 (highlighting the debates among white Republicans on whether the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should encompass political rights); KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE
FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. 117–20 (2010) (noting that “many who helped pass the law over Johnson’s veto believed voting
rights for black men would be disastrous”).
1834 National Convention, supra note 39, at 12.
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 9.
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 9 (highlighting that the idea of a right to protection/duty
to protect was especially important for free Black northerners, who experienced the failures of what
they called “nominal freedom,” and would become an important principle for Reconstruction).
E.g., 1832 National Convention, supra note 31, at 17 (noting that emigrants from Ohio sought place
where “the roaring billows of prejudice are less injurious to their rights and privileges”).
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expressed a significant fear that, in the aftermath of the Nat Turner rebellion,
race prejudice was becoming a dominant governing principle:
The recent occurrences at the South, have swelled the tide of prejudice
until it has almost revolutionized public sentiment, which has given
birth to severe legislative enactments in some of the States, and almost
ruined our interests and prospects in others . . . our situation is more
precarious than it has been at any other period since the Declaration
of Independance [sic].64
This was true in some very particular ways for delegates. Not only did each
of them have their own personal histories of race prejudice and violence, but
such episodes punctuated the conventions. The initial convention was itself a
response to anti-Black rioting and exclusions in Cincinnati. The 1832
Convention was forced to revise the project started the prior year for college
in New Haven because of the fierce white opposition in Connecticut,
opposition which continued in the legal and extralegal opposition to the
founding of a girls school as well.65 Then, after the 1834 Convention met in
June at the interracial Chatham Chapel in New York City, a series of white
riots took place, triggered by a July 4th meeting of white and Black abolitionists
in the Chatham Chapel (and perhaps also fueled by the presence a month
earlier of the National Convention). The riots overwhelmed the city for three
hot summer days, destroyed a Black church as well as the home of Lewis
Tappen, and laid bare the fierce violent resistance of white northerners
(including recent immigrants) to Black emancipation.66 No doubt delegates to
the 1835 Convention were profoundly affected by the riots (some, like Samuel
Cornish, had likely been present during them), as they included a resolution
honoring Black residents of New York for their “forbearance” during the
“mob riots of 1834.”67 These events also likely inspired them to include
protection of rights and privileges as an essential aspect of citizenship.
This analysis of prejudice also framed the conventions’ arguments about
colonization. The delegates highlighted racism as the true basis for the ACS’s

64
65
66

67

Id. at 17; see also SINHA, supra note 16, at 210–13 (highlighting the effects of Nat Turner’s resistance
action).
1832 National Convention, supra note 31, at 23; see also Stewart, supra note 54, at 325–26
(emphasizing that white opposition “would not tolerate a large number of young colored men”).
Linda K. Kerber, Abolitionists and Amalgamators: The New York City Race Riots of 1834, 48 N.Y.
HIST. 28, 28 (1967); see also GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 108–09 (highlighting that the consequences
of violence “produced and reproduced political and social identities” within African Americans);
ALEXANDER, supra note 45, 85–86; W. Caleb McDaniel, The Fourth and the First: Abolitionist
Holidays, Respectability, and Radical Interracial Reform, 57 AM. Q. 129, 135–36 (2005) (describing
riots that disrupted the Chatham Street Chapel and destroyed the home of Lewis Tappan).
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 19.
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efforts to move African Americans to Liberia.68 In exposing and critiquing
white efforts at colonization, the Black conventions were identifying a
significant racial retrenchment by white people across the country. As they
pointed out, despite the termination of slavery in the North, the effects of racial
slavery—both its past in the North and its ongoing implementation in the
South—were being felt throughout the country in the form of a more virulent
race prejudice that had become a motivation for legal, political, and social
subordination. Thus we see in these early conventions the use of a metaphor
that was to become a staple of the Black public sphere in describing the evils
of race prejudice: the “monster” and “demon” of racism.69 This monster
metaphor aptly described how racial prejudice operated, less as a discrete foe
defeated in battle and more as an omnipresent entity that required persistent
and multifaceted opposition.
Other ideas were being developed at these conventions as well. William
Hamilton, in his president’s Address in 1834, outlined an anti-caste approach
to civil and political equality that stressed the importance of a broad-based
community of interests where “the good of one is the common good of the
whole”, an idea that we see repeated frequently among radical abolitionists
through Reconstruction.70 For Hamilton, racial caste and race prejudice,
precisely because they divorced the interests of free Black people from the
“community” interests protected by white people, compelled African
Americans to form organizations like the Convention and to focus almost
68
69

70

1833 National Convention, supra note 36, at 34–35.
Id. at 32 (showing that, in the address of Abraham D. Shadd, he utilized language like “that monster,
prejudice”); see also 1834 National Convention, supra note 39, at 4 (quoting “the demon of
prejudice” in the address of William Hamilton).
1834 National Convention, supra note 39, at 3; see also id. at 3–4 (articulating the problem of caste
which anticipated an important theme in the 1850s and 1860s and one that is arguably central to the
Reconstruction Amendments). The Convention explained:
[T]he present form of society divides the interest of the community into several parts. Of
these, there is that of the white man, that of the slave, and that of the free coloured man.
How lamentable . . . it is that there should be, any where on earth, a community of castes,
with separate interests! . . . But alas for the people of colour in this community! [T]heir
interest is not identified with that of other men. From them, white men stand aloof. For
them the eye of pity hath scarcely a tear . . . . To them the finger of scorn is pointed . . .
[t]hey must cringe, and crouch, and crawl, and succumb to their peers.
Id.; see also William M. Carter, Jr., Class as Caste: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Applicability to
Class-Based Subordination, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 813, 813–14 (2016) (highlighting the idea of
caste and how it influenced abolitionists and the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments);
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, THE FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR: JAMES MITCHELL ASHLEY AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF RECONSTRUCTION 34–35 (2018) (“Other antislavery constitutionalists
also claimed that the Constitution was an anticlass, anticaste document.”); Bryan K. Fair, The
Anatomy of American Caste, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 381, 389–97 (1999) (arguing that
scholars never discussed the foundations for an anticaste equality theory across axes of caste).
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single-mindedly on their own interests.71 And for Hamilton, as for all of the
conventions, the race prejudice oppressing Black people in the North was
inextricably connected to racial slavery and its continued growth in the South.72
The Conventions of the 1830s, however, steered closely to a moderate,
moral uplift ideology and largely avoided direct political action beyond
organizing resistance to the ACS and temperance societies.73 By 1835 the
leaders of the convention movement had shifted their focus away from
emigration and opposition to colonization in favor of a movement more
focused on moral reform. The final convention of this period established the
American Moral Reform Society, which appears to have replaced the
conventions and shifted the focus to “Education, Temperance, Economy, and
Universal Liberty[.]”74 It also reflected a growing split among Black leaders
about the direction and means of Black resistance and organizations that
would take some time to work through.75 While the 1835 Convention still
expressed the importance of a national identity and struggle, called on the
Declaration of Independence as the source of their “first principles” for a just
and republican government, and critiqued American society for its
“inconsistencies” and “aberration” from those principles, the delegates
decided to focus on moral reform methods to implement these ideas.76 They
saw themselves as model Black citizens who set out to battle prejudice by
internal improvement, or what would later be known as racial uplift.77 As they
71

72
73
74

75

76
77

The Convention stated:
Under present circumstances it is highly necessary the free people of colour should
combine, and closely attend to their own particular interest. All kinds of jealousy should
be swept away from among them, and their whole eye fixed, intently fixed, on their own
peculiar welfare. And can they do better than to meet thus [in this Convention]; to take
into consideration what are the best means to promote their elevation, and after having
decided, to pursue those means with unabating zeal until their end is obtained?”
1834 National Convention, supra note 39, at 4.
Id. at 6.
On antebellum uplift ideology as a form of Black resistance, and the problems it encountered in a
culture of pervasive white prejudice, see RAEL, supra note 18, at 118–208.
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 31–32. On the connections between the moral reform
aspects of the conventions and efforts to seek political change, see GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 114–
25.
The organizers of the American Moral Reform Society, William Whipper and Robert Purvis,
insisted it be an interracial organization, while Samuel Cornish (who had been a leader in the
conventions) and others advocated for Black-only institutions as an essential aspect of resistance to
white supremacy. RAEL, supra note 18, at 49–53. This debate would continue to be important aspect
of the convention movement and Black public sphere.
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 28.
Glaude, borrowing from Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham’s analysis of the end of the nineteenth
century, describes this as the 1830s version of the politics of respectability in which right/moral
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put it, “[w]e are unable to conceive of any better method by which we can aid
the cause of human liberty, than by improving our general character, and
embracing within our grasp the liberated slave for moral and mental culture.”78
This was a group that still saw the Garrisonian ideas of moral suasion as fresh
and viable. As we will see, this moral reform strand within the Black public
sphere would continue to be important, but as an exclusive strategy it would
increasingly be questioned as slavery and white prejudice seemed to only
harden in response to 1830s abolitionism and the increase in Black autonomy
and cultural presence.
III. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE BLACK COUNTERPUBLIC:
CONVENTIONS OF THE 1840S AND 1850S
The period from the end of the initial annual national conventions in 1835
through the late 1850s reflected an evolution of the Black public sphere
generally, a process reflected in the convention movement. At first there was
a period of dissent and disagreement, as ideological and regional differences
predominated.79 There was no national convention until 1843, and from 1843
through the start of the Civil War there were five national conventions.80 But
far from indicating a weakness in the convention movement, this intermittence
in national conventions was in large part due to the explosion of state-level
conventions in the 1840s and 1850s.81 There were over forty-five state and

78
79
80

81

behavior was both a goal in itself and a means of breaking down racial prejudice and earning full
respect. GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 117–18.
1835 National Convention, supra note 39, at 29.
ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 117.
The five conventions were 1843 (Buffalo), 1847 (Troy), 1848 (Cleveland), 1853 (Rochester), and
1855 (Philadelphia). In addition, the North American 1851 Convention in Toronto could be
considered the equivalent of a national meeting. This list does not include two single-topic
conventions, the Fugitive Slave Law Convention of 1850 and the National Emigration Convention of
1854. Both could reasonably be considered national but because of their issue focus they did not
comprehend a cross section of Black communities. The Fugitive Slave Law Convention held in
Cazenovia, N.Y., was an important biracial abolitionist convention organized primarily by white
abolitionists but actively seeking to fuse together the branches of abolitionism, including radical Black
abolitionists. STANLEY HARROLD, THE RISE OF AGGRESSIVE ABOLITIONISM: ADDRESSES TO THE
SLAVES 123–24 (2004). The National Emigration Convention of 1854 was organized by Martin
Delaney and focused on his more radical positions favoring emigration and opposing suffrage and
opposing Frederick Douglass’s efforts, among others. SINHA, supra note 16, at 576. For a
chronological list of state and national conventions, see Conventions by Year, COLORED
CONVENTIONS PROJECT, https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/convention-by-year (last visited Jan.
11, 2021).
See, e.g., SPIRES, supra note 10, at 82–86 (arguing that the focus on state conventions was a necessary
reaction to suffrage laws and other state and local manifestations of white supremacy across the
north).
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regional conventions during this time, showing a robust local and state activism
that had been one of the goals of the initial movement in the 1830s.82 And the
increasing participation of western communities, especially Ohio, showed a
geographic and ideological breadth, as well as demographic changes, that were
only just emerging in the 1830s.83
Indeed, the proliferation of state-level conventions appears to have
enabled national conventions to focus more on national strategies. State
conventions addressed topics of local concern and provided a filter of sorts
for the creation of a national agenda.84 This also allowed for national meetings
to be more representative geographically and demographically, being
composed of representatives who were often connected to state and local
organizations.85 Thus, by the late 1840s, the conventions were building an
organizational structure and rhetorical range that helped support a broader
oppositional counterpublic in the North and West. Moreover, state
conventions were considering some issues from a national perspective—the
national identity forged in the 1830s continued to influence how Black leaders
and Black communities discussed their interests.86 Thus one sees some
themes throughout the conventions that are significant in the development of
constitutional ideas and constitutional identity for antebellum Black
Americans and would have important influences on Reconstruction.

A. 1843 National Convention at Buffalo
If the conventions of the 1830s veered more towards moral reform and
social respectability as the primary means of resistance and less toward an
overtly political and confrontational style, the 1843 National Convention in
82

83
84

85

86

For an actively updated list of state and regional conventions, see State Conventions, COLORED
CONVENTIONS PROJECT, https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/state-conventions (last visited Jan.
11, 2021).
The first Ohio convention was in 1837, with ten more prior to the Civil War. African Americans in
Indiana held their first convention in 1842, in Illinois and Iowa in 1853, and California in 1855. Id.
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 11, at 79–99 (discussing, among other things, the relationship and crossinfluences between the national and state conventions); SPIRES, supra note 10, at 85–86 (discussing
how state-level convention organizing was seen as a means of focusing on issues of more immediate
concern to Black residents in the state).
ERNEST, A NATION WITHIN A NATION, supra note 11, at 111–20; see also SPIRES, supra note 10,
at 85 (“[B]lack activists were continually balancing the benefits of national conventions (particularly
for antislavery initiatives, economic uplift, and institution building) and local associations calibrated
to deal with the specificity of local politics and variations in racist practices.”).
This point is evident in the manner in which the state conventions explored the state and local
implementation of the concept of full citizenship, itself a concept forged in the national movement
of the 1830s. See, e.g., SPIRES, supra note 10, at 79–120 (exploring the state convention movement
as a means of enacting, creating, and “circulating” citizenship ideas in the Black public sphere).
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Buffalo did just the opposite. There are many reasons for this, not the least
of which was the full disenfranchisement of Black Pennsylvanians by state
constitutional amendment in 1838, done despite the well organized and
forceful opposition of Black communities across the state, particularly the
Black community in Philadelphia that had played such a large part in the
1830s conventions.87 This loss of political power laid bare the threats faced by
Black Americans even in northern states with progressive histories on slavery.
It also revealed that social and economic advances by Black northerners could
be threatening to white people and were not necessarily the path to equal
treatment and respect that Black leaders had hoped. This was especially true
in the late 1830s when the country fell into an economic depression more
severe than any it had seen to that point.88 In addition, a younger generation
of leaders and activists were coming of age in the 1840s, a generation much
more open to political activism and independence and for whom abolitionist
immediatism was the only plausible response to slavery.89
One such leader was Henry Highland Garnet. Garnet was born enslaved
but his family escaped to the North when he was young.90 He attended the
African Free School, a school for Black northerners that produced some of
the leading Black abolitionists of the 1840s and 1850s.91 In the Black
community of New York City he experienced a strong communal self-reliance
ethic and an exposure to an early version of Black Nationalism.92 His early
experiences in New York and later New Hampshire also impressed on him
the importance of active resistance. Within a couple of years of arriving in
New York his family was forced to flee their home when a slave kidnapper
sought to capture his family, an experience that made Garnet feel very directly
87

88
89

90

91

92

See Eric Ledell Smith, The End of Black Voting Rights in Pennsylvania: African Americans and the
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1837-1838, 65 PA. HIST. 279, 279 (1998) (detailing the
significance of the disenfranchisement of Black Pennsylvanians and Black opposition to this).
On the Panic of 1837, see generally ALASDAIR ROBERTS, AMERICA’S FIRST GREAT DEPRESSION:
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837 (2012).
See, e.g., PEASE & PEASE, supra note 17, at 122–23 (identifying newer generation of Black leaders,
writers, and speakers who rose during the conventions of the 1840s); SINHA, supra note 16, at 319–
25 (discussing importance of voting rights and political activism to participants in the 1840s
conventions).
Sterling Stuckey, A Last Stern Struggle: Henry Highland Garnet and Liberation Theory, in BLACK
LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 129 (Leon Litwack & August Meier, eds., 1988)
[hereinafter Stuckey, A Last Stern Struggle]; STERLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST
THEORY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK AMERICA 156–58 (2013) [hereinafter STUCKEY,
SLAVE CULTURE].
Stuckey, A Last Stern Struggle, supra note 90, 131–33. On the African Free School, see John L.
Rury, The New York African Free School, 1827-1836: Conflict over Community Control of Black
Education, 44 PHYLON 187, 187 (1983).
Stuckey, A Last Stern Struggle, supra note 90, at 130–31.
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the need for self-protection.93 Then, around the age of twenty, Garnet traveled
from New York to New Hampshire to attend a school in Canaan, New
Hampshire. He and his classmates were met by violent white locals who
destroyed the school, forcing them to leave town; Garnet’s own overnight vigil
with a shotgun may well have kept the mob from attacking them.94 This
incident, all too similar to the reaction to Black education and advancement
in Connecticut, seemed to instill in Garnet a deep belief that moral reform
and improvement, by itself, was not enough, and that more than moral suasion
would be needed to force white people to end racial slavery and help free
Black people attain equality.95
Garnet began exploring his views publicly around 1840.96 It is likely that
Garnet was the author of a series of letters in The Colored American in 1841
under the pseudonym “Sidney” in which he argued for a distinctively African
American response to oppression.97 Responding to William Whipper’s letters
arguing against the use of racial language like “colored,” “Sidney” argued that
the problem was not the acknowledgement of race, but the actual experiences
of oppression that caused race to be significant: “Whenever a people are
oppressed, peculiarly (not complexionally) distinctive organizations or action,
is required on the part of the oppressed to destroy that oppression. The
colored people of this country are oppressed; therefore the colored people
are required to act in accordance with this fundamental principle.”98 For
Sidney, resistance to oppression and liberation could only be achieved by
organization and action by the oppressed; white abolitionists could be allies,
but the driving motivation and action had to come from Black communities:
“We occupy a position, and sustain relations which they cannot possibly
assume. They are our allies—Ours is the battle.”99 Whether scholars are right
that Garnet penned these ideas, the sentiments are consistent with Garnet’s

93
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Id. at 130.
Id. at 132.
See, e.g., STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE, supra note 90, at 172–80 (tracing Garnet’s development of a
radical resistance philosophy from his early confrontations with violent racism to advocacy of violent
slave resistance and break with Garrisonians).
Id. at 170–72.
Sterling Stuckey argues that Garnet authored these letters, using as a pseudonym the name of his
talented classmate and friend, Thomas Sidney, who had recently died. Id. at 249.
GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 140 (quoting “Sidney,” The Colored American, March 13, 1841). For
Glaude’s discussion, see id. at 140–42. For Stuckey’s, see STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE, supra note
90, at 239–49. See also SPIRES, supra note 10, at 101 (discussing how “Sidney” and Samuel Ringgold
Ward “connect being ‘colored’ to a historical experience of Anti-Blackness and to a mode of seeing
this oppression as an issue of political power and representation”).
Stuckey, A Last Stern Struggle, supra note 90, at 134.
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views. Garnet and his peers sought to press the Black public sphere toward a
more direct engagement with slavery and race prejudice.100
No moment better reflects this engagement, and the debate within the
Black public sphere, than does Garnet’s Address to the Slaves delivered in
Buffalo at the 1843 National Convention.101 Garnet’s Address and its call for
direct and forceful slave resistance and rebellion clearly captured the attention
of the delegates (“the whole Convention . . . was literally infused with tears”)
and came within one vote of being adopted as a statement of the body.102
Debate over this question extended over several days. The question of
whether it was too radical divided the convention, with Frederick Douglass,
still firmly espousing Garrisonian non-violence, leading the thin majority in
opposing its adoption. Garnet’s Address, despite not winning approval in
1843, was to become a leading statement of a Black liberationism that
informed much of Black resistance thought well into Reconstruction.
The Address is perhaps best known for its call for active resistance by
enslaved Black people, advocating what white people most feared, a
widespread rebellion in the spirit of Nat Turner. Garnet, a Presbyterian
minister, saw slavery as a deep offense to God and argued that all men, free
and enslaved, had an obligation to oppose it. He insisted that the mere fact of
being enslaved did not absolve slaves of this obligation: “it is your solemn and
imperative duty to use every means, both moral[,] intellectual and physical that

100 GLAUDE, supra note 11, at 142.
101 Henry Highland Garnet, An Address to the Slaves of the United States of America, first read at the
National Convention of Colored Citizens, Buffalo, New York (Aug. 16, 1843) [hereinafter Garnet,
Address to the Slaves]. For this article I used the version of the Address available at
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/8/. It was originally printed in HENRY HIGHLAND GARNET,
WALKER’S APPEAL, WITH A BRIEF SKETCH OF HIS LIFE. AND ALSO GARNET’S ADDRESS TO THE
SLAVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 89–97 (1848). We have Garnet’s Address because
he published a revised version in this later text. We do not have a copy of Frederick Douglass’s
response address, or Garnet’s rebuttal—a rebuttal that some called Garnet’s greatest speech. Stuckey,
A Last Stern Struggle, supra note 90, at 135.
102 For the description of the reception of the Address, see MINUTES OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
OF COLORED CITIZENS: HELD AT BUFFALO, ON THE 15TH, 16TH, 17TH, 18TH, AND 19TH OF
AUGUST, 1843, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THEIR MORAL AND POLITICAL CONDITION
AS
AMERICAN CITIZENS 13 (1943) [hereinafter 1843 National Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/73369fab9bb261275b57276ccbdbded2.pdf.
For the vote, see id. at 18–19. See also EZRA GREENSPAN, WILLIAM WELLS BROWN: AN
AMERICAN LIFE 118–20 (2014). William Wells Brown, a leading abolitionist, speaker, and novelist,
later would describe Garnet’s speech as “one of the most noted addresses ever given by a colored
man in this country” and said that “none but those who heard that speech have the slightest idea of
the tremendous influence which he exercised over the assembly.” Id. at 119 (quoting WILLIAM
WELLS BROWN, THE BLACK MAN, HIS ANTECEDENTS, HIS GENIUS, AND HIS ACHIEVEMENTS
149–50 (1863)).
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promises success.”103 He argued that the same level and manner of resistance
was justified in ending slavery as was in fighting the initial enslavement—a full
physical self-defense. Garnet then paraphrased a line from Lord Byron that
would become a common rally cry for Black abolitionism’s self-reliance
ideology: “the time has come when you must act for yourselves. It is an old
and true saying that, ‘if hereditary bondman would be free, they must
themselves strike the blow.’”104 Garnet then proposed a plan of action that
framed violent resistance as an end point in a process, as a last resort, and as
a choice made by the enslavers.
[G]o to your lordly enslavers and tell them plainly, that you are determined to
be free. Appeal to their sense of justice, and tell them that they have no more
right to oppress you, than you have to enslave them. Entreat them to remove
the grievous burdens which they have imposed upon you, and to remunerate
you for your labor. Promise them renewed diligence in the cultivation of the
soil, if they will render to you an equivalent for your services. Point them to
the increase of happiness and prosperity in the British West Indies since the
Act of Emancipation. Tell them in language which they cannot
misunderstand, of the exceeding sinfulness of slavery, and of a future
judgment, and of the righteous retributions of an indignant God. Inform them
that all you desire is freedom, and that nothing else will suffice. Do this, and
for ever after cease to toil for the heartless tyrants, who give you no other
reward but stripes and abuse. If they then commence the work of death, they,
and not you, will be responsible for the consequences. You had far better all
die—die immediately, than live slaves, and entail your wretchedness upon your
posterity. If you would be free in this generation, here is your only hope.
However much you and all of us may desire it, there is not much hope of
redemption without the shedding of blood. If you must bleed, let it all come
at once—rather die freemen, than live to be [] slaves.
105

This remarkable passage makes plain the necessity of violent resistance in
much the same way that the American colonists did in the Declaration. This
is violence as reasoned strategy, violence as the last resort in the quest for
God’s justice and God-given liberty. This was the violence of a people who
were more civilized than those who violently enslaved them (and Garnet made
a point of highlighting the violence—the lashing, the murdering, the raping—
that was an essential characteristic of slavery). Earlier in the Address Garnet
Garnet, Address to the Slaves, supra note 101, at 5.
Id. at 6. The line from Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage reads “[h]ereditary bondsmen! know ye not/Who
would be free themselves must strike the blow?” LORD BYRON, CHILDE HAROLD’S PILGRIMAGE
122 (2009). Frederick Douglass and James McCune Smith also used this line. See FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM: PART I.—LIFE AS A SLAVE. PART II.—LIFE AS A
FREEMAN, at xxiii (1855). Manisha Sinha also locates abolitionists’ use of Byron’s line in the
connections with European freedom movements of the 1830s and 1840s. SINHA, supra note 16, at
364.
105 Garnet, Address to the Slaves, supra note 101, at 7–8.
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had discussed the American Revolution, highlighting its justification of violent
resistance as necessary in a battle for freedom and liberty. Garnet
acknowledged that “[t]he declaration was a glorious document” and that the
spirit of the Revolution was noble, then immediately called out white
Americans for their failure to do the very thing they claimed as the justification
for the Revolution: ending slavery: “When the power of Government returned
to their hands, did they emancipate the slaves? No; they rather added new
links to our chains. Were they ignorant of the principles of Liberty? Certainly
they were not.”106 Their cry for “Liberty or death”, Garnet argued, betrayed
their own self-conscious hypocrisy.
Garnet reformulated the slavery analogy used by white Americans during
the Revolution into an argument for the self-liberation of actual slaves,
invoking Patrick Henry’s famous line when he exhorted: “See your sons
murdered, and your wives, mothers and sisters doomed to prostitution. In the
name of the merciful God, and by all that life is worth, let it no longer be a
debatable question, whether it is better to choose Liberty or death.”107 Garnet
then named the models of slave rebellion well known to enslaved Black
people and their white enslavers (Toussaint L’Ouverture, Denmark Vesey,
Nat Turner, Cinque, and Madison Washington) and placed them in line with
revolutionary heroes honored by white Americans (George Washington,
Lafayette, and the Scottish hero William Wallace), thus further bolstering his
claim that Black antislavery resistance should be considered the continuation
of the great revolutions of Liberty that so formed white American identity.108
Garnet concluded with his famous call: “Let your motto be resistance!
resistance! resistance! No oppressed people have ever secured their liberty
without resistance.”109
It would only be slight hyperbole to say that Garnet’s resistance manifesto
transformed Black abolition into a second American Revolution. The speech
established, with the boldness and clarity he would be known for, what became
a central argument of the antebellum and Civil War era Black public sphere:
that active slave resistance, including the use of violence, was a necessary part
of what was seen as the second revolution for American liberty. Despite its
one-vote defeat at Buffalo, Garnet’s speech so inspired his audience that he
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Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 11. The invocation of Black resistance fighters as being in a line with white revolutionaries was
a rhetorical mode also employed by Frederick Douglass. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM 287 (2018).
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was asked to deliver it again at the next Black National Convention in Troy in
1847.110 And although Frederick Douglass continued in 1847 to lead the
opposition to Garnet’s insurrectionary activism, even Douglass would come
around to this position by the late 1850s when he supported violent overthrow
of slavery.111 On the cusp of the Civil War, Garnet’s rebellion theory was as
much a part of the Black public sphere as were the moral reform and racial
uplift ideas of the 1830s (which Garnet also advocated).112 Indeed, it is critical
to understanding antebellum Black constitutionalism to comprehend the full
significance of how Black people saw their work as a second revolution and
the subsequent work to rebuild the Constitution and the country during and
after the war as a second founding.
The shift in tenor crystalized in Garnet’s Address can be seen in each of
the three national conventions held in the 1840s. In 1843, for instance, the
call for the convention described it as a convention “of the oppressed citizens
of the United States.”113 This language embraced the citizenship language of
the 1830s conventions and tied it to the claim that all African Americans were
united by white racial oppression. The opening address by Samuel Davis also
captured the tenor of Garnet’s activism by asserting the need for Black
Americans to initiate their own actions. Petitioning white people for change
had little effect, argued Davis: “Our petitions were disregarded; our
supplications slighted . . . No other hope is left us but our own exertions
. . . .”114 Neither white legislatures, nor white churches, nor white political
parties had been much help, he thundered. Not even white abolitionists,
despite their “noble efforts,” were any substitute for Black activism. “If we are
not willing to rise up and assert our rightful claims, and plead our own cause,”

110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORED PEOPLE, AND THEIR FRIENDS,
HELD IN TROY, N.Y., ON THE 6TH, 7TH, 8TH, AND 9TH OF OCTOBER, 1847, at 10 (1847)
[hereinafter 1847 National Convention], https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/items/show/279
(noting that Garnet read an eloquent and impressive address to the Slaves of the United States and
inviting him to speak at this convention).
111 See BLIGHT, supra note 109, 280–309. Douglass expressly advocated that while the “ballot is
needed, [but] if this will not be heard and heeded, then the bullet.” Id. at 304 (quoting Frederick
Douglass, “The Ballot and the Bullet,” Douglass’ Monthly, Oct. 1859).
112 See SINHA, supra note 16, at 550–66 (discussing radicalization of abolition in late-1850s and the
general support for John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry); id. at 418–19 (discussing radicalism of
Garnet’s 1843 address); id. at 450–51 (discussing how Frederick Douglass, having opposed Garnet’s
1843 address, evolved to advocate slave self-defense and slave resistance in the late-1840s and 1850s);
BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 304–05 (discussing Douglass’s “The Ballot and the Bullet” essay of 1859
in which he expressed his frustration with political abolition and advocacy of “the bullet” as a
necessary option for freedom).
113 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 3.
114 Id. at 6.
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Davis continued, “we have no reason to look for success. We, ourselves, must
be willing to contend for the rich boon of freedom and equal rights, or we shall
never enjoy that boon.”115 This freedom and equality of rights, Davis
contended, were guaranteed by the Constitution and yet denied throughout
the country by prejudice. Davis articulated more clearly than had most
speakers at prior conventions the principle of equal rights, the idea that the
liberty that white Americans so firmly proclaimed necessarily required that all
laws be “just and equal for all the people.”116 This required equal access to
basic rights of travel, suffrage, and education that enabled white Americans to
pursue and attain happiness.117 This focus on legal equality, on the tight
connection between true liberty and equality in law, and on suffrage as the
essential guarantor of those rights, challenged northern Jim Crow more
directly than had prior conventions of Black leaders (and more than had most
white abolitionists).
The new activism of the convention was also reflected in its embrace of
political action and the newly formed Liberty Party. Political engagement had
been a contested point for abolitionists. Garrisonians, who had been closely
aligned with the 1830s conventions, generally adopted the view that all political
participation in a slaveowning republic was illegitimate and sinful, and so
opposed any allegiance with political parties.118 The Liberty Party had been
formed in 1840 by white abolitionists who broke from the more Garrisonian
American Antislavery Society.119 The Garrisonian position was defended by
Frederick Douglass, William Wells Brown, and others allied with Garrison.120
Unlike the debate over Garnet’s Address, however, on this point Douglass was
in the distinct minority. Political action, it seemed, was becoming an accepted
means of resistance for Black abolitionists. This made sense, of course, given
the importance of suffrage for delegates at the state conventions of the period,
115
116
117
118

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4–5.

On William Lloyd Garrison’s views, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 228–48 (1977) (exploring Garrison’s intellectual
and spiritual perfectionism as it developed from the 1830s through the 1840s and its weakness as a
political and constitutional philosophy). In 1842, Garrison referred to voting in a slave-based political
system as “Satanic” and “inherently wicked and murderous”. Id. at 239 (citation omitted); see also
HORTON & HORTON, supra note 30, at 242–50 (discussing Garrison’s rejection of political
participation and the opposition to this view from Black and white abolitionists).
119 See SINHA, supra note 16, at 463–65 (discussing the differences and connections between
Garrisonians and the founders of the Liberty Party in the 1840s).
120 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 15 (noting that Frederick Douglass, W. W. Brown, C.
L. Remond, R. Francis, and P. Harris opposed a resolution they contended was a Liberty Party
resolution and underscoring their opposition to the Liberty Party).
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as discussed below. Whereas white Garrisonians could find meaning in the
withholding of the right to political participation that they already possessed,
Black northerners in many states were struggling to gain the right of suffrage
in the first place (or, in the case of Pennsylvania to regain what had just been
taken away). They were therefore not very interested in refusing to engage in
the very thing they sought so hard to obtain and which defined their own status
as full citizens. Over time, this aspect of Garrisonianism would have less and
less purchase on Black abolitionism.121
A similar debate arose over the question of claims of constitutional
citizenship. A resolution criticizing recent court opinions denying citizenship
to Black Americans was debated. Douglass opposed the motion on the
Garrisonian ground that the “constitution of this country was a slaveholding
instrument, and as such denied all rights to the colored man.”122 Other
delegates rejected this claim and opposed the resolution on the opposite
ground that citizenship was so self-evident that no statement to that effect was
needed.123 Nobody else spoke up in favor of Douglass’s anti-constitutionalism.
Over time, with the increasing denial of citizenship rights and status in the
north and eventually with the Dred Scott decision, almost all Black leaders,
including Frederick Douglass, would come to see the affirmative claim of
citizenship as one of their most important statements.124

121 On the split within between Garrisonians and the political and evangelical abolitionists, see SINHA,
supra note 16, at 256–65 (discussing differences in strategy and ideology of Garrisonians and other
abolitionist groups). This schism also involved disagreements about the importance of women’s
suffrage and women’s participation in the movement. Id. Sinha argues that Black abolitionists, more
than anything, found the schism a needless distraction. Id. at 264. Black abolitionists in Boston
tended to support Garrison through the 1840s, and those from other areas generally supported
political abolitionists. See, e.g., id. at 319 (discussing how Black abolitionists in New York saw
political involvement as central for establishing Black rights); see also BENJAMIN QUARLES, BLACK
ABOLITIONISTS 42–67 (1969). Quarles notes that one concern for Black abolitionists was the not
infrequent racial prejudice in practice in white abolitionists organizations and a general failure to
support explicitly full social and economic equality. Id. at 47–50. These themes are also evident in
the conventions.
122 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 17.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORED MEN, HELD IN THE CITY
OF SYRACUSE, N.Y., OCTOBER 4, 5, 6, AND 7, 1864; WITH THE BILL OF WRONGS AND RIGHTS,
AND THE ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 15 (1864) [hereinafter 1864 National Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/91057571556d503505e8e86e8474d923.pdf
(showing John Mercer Langston discussing the importance of a recent opinion by Attorney General
Bates confirming Black citizenship and highlighting a resolution asserting citizenship); see also
BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 478–79 (noting Douglass recognizing importance of citizenship aspects
of the 1866 Civil Rights Bill); JONES, supra note 7, 9–12 (discussing importance and complexity of
citizenship claims by African Americans in antebellum period).
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Other than the disputes over political engagement, however, the
convention overwhelming embraced a range of rights and activities that they
saw as central to full citizenship. They issued a report on the importance of
the mechanical arts (skilled trades and engineering) and education, on the
development of the Black press as crucial in a democratic society, and on the
importance of land ownership and agriculture to self-sufficiency.125 In these
reports the convention set out a civil society vision of freedom that reflected a
concrete and practical definition of their goals, one that showed why their
rights claims were so important.

B. 1847 National Convention, Troy
This connection between rights claims and civil society activism reveals the
critical work the conventions did in knitting together the basic principles
animating Black abolitionism and the practical means (and difficulties) for
implementing those principles. The debate about supporting the Black press
at the 1847 convention provides a revealing case in point. It had been well
established that the abolitionist press was a crucial means of advancing the
cause of liberty. William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator had served as a
critical forum for communication among white and Black abolitionists, for the
exploration of ideas within the movement, and for efforts to advocate for
change to legislators and citizens outside the movement.126 The Black press,
too, had done the same, including providing important forums for debate
among African Americans, as was seen, for instance, in the letter exchanges in
The Colored American between “Sidney” and William Whipper.127 But
financing was always a struggle for Black presses. At the 1847 Convention a
proposal was made to establish a national printing press to support a national
Black periodical.128 James McCune Smith, a leading Black intellectual and
doctor from New York who had written on a variety of topics, including
abolition, and had briefly served as editor for The Colored American, stressed

125 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 27–36.
126 See, e.g., SINHA, supra note 16, at 217–18, 300, 304–05 (emphasizing the importance of The
Liberator to Black abolitionists in getting their message out).
127 On the importance of the antebellum Black press, see ERNEST, LIBERATION HISTORIOGRAPHY,
supra note 11, at 277–329; QUARLES, supra note 121, at 68–89.
128 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORED PEOPLE, AND THEIR FRIENDS,
HELD IN TROY, N.Y., ON THE 6TH, 7TH, 8TH, AND 9TH OCTOBER, 1847, at 6–7 (1847) [hereinafter
1847 National Convention], https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/items/show/279.
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the need for a national press.129 As Smith argued, the press was an important
means for achieving other rights and liberties, such as suffrage.130 The absence
of a Black press circulating in Connecticut, he suggested, left “the colored
people of that State . . . without the necessary means through which to make
known and urge their claims,--whereas [a national press could] . . . speak[]
forth our sentiments, mak[e] known the wrongs we suffer, and demand[] the
rights due manhood . . . .”131 The type of advocacy needed for Black
Americans to organize and to persuade white legislators required written
periodicals designed to communicate the views and opinions of Black
northerners. Smith here captured the interrelationship of civil society and
how important the actual exercise of press and speech rights were to achieving
suffrage and other basic rights.
Interestingly, Frederick Douglass opposed this proposal.132 Perhaps his
interest in the success of his own paper, The Northern Star, which he was just
about to start, influenced his opposition (he mentioned his paper, along with
two others, as possible alternatives for direct support from the convention).133
But he also argued that a dedicated press connected with the convention
“would soon dwindle down to be the organ of a clique,” by which he may
have meant that leaders of the convention from New York City would
dominate the press.134 William Wells Brown worried that Black subscribers
might not be able to sustain multiple papers and thought it unlikely that a new
paper could compete with The Liberator for the limited funds of Black
readers (this was a reasonable concern and may be the reason that the press
never materialized).135 At any rate, the concerns for how best to establish and
maintain a press that could reflect the variety of views in the growing northern
Black community showed the importance the convention placed on both the
press and also on social and economic groundwork necessary for that press to
do the work so central to their mission.

129 Id. at 7. On Smith’s editorship of The Colored American, see Howard H. Bell, National Negro
Conventions of the Middle 1840’s: Moral Suasion vs. Political Action, 42 J. NEGRO HIST. 247, 258
(1957).
130 1847 National Convention, supra note 128, at 6–7.
131 Id. at 7 (summarizing the argument of James McCune Smith).
132 Id. at 6–7.
133 Id.; see also BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 188–91 (discussing Douglass’s participation at the 1847
convention and subsequent formation of the North Star).
134 1847 National Convention, supra note 128, at 7.
135 Id.; see also GREENSPAN, supra note 102, at 120–22 (describing Brown and the 1843 and 1847
conventions’ calls for a Black press).
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In the end, the convention approved a committee report (the “Report”)
supporting a national press.136 The Report nicely framed the importance of
the press: “Of the means for the advancement of a people placed as we are,
none are more available than a Press. We struggle against opinions. Our
warfare lies in the field of thought.”137 To recruit soldiers for this war and carry
on the battles, they argued, “we need a Printing Press, because a printing press
is the vehicle of thought—is a ruler of opinions.”138 The press would aid the
Black community internally: it “shall keep us steadily alive to our
responsibilities . . .point out the principles which should guide our conduct
and our labors,” and communicate the success and failures and the eventual
triumph of “Human Equality.”139 They argued that, while other avenues for
advancement, such as education, were equally or even more important in
substance, the Black press was critical for the organization and communication
of those other successes. It was invaluable as a public space, “a field in which
the relative importance of the various means [for advancement] may be
discussed and settled in the hearing of the whole people, to the profit of all.”140
Thus the press was seen as a core locus for democratic civil society, carrying
to the broader Black public the ideas and debates being explored at
conventions and elsewhere.
If the press was critical for internal dialogue within the Black public sphere,
the Report also recognized its value in external communications: “We need a
Press also as our Banner on the outer wall, that all who pass may read why we
struggle, how we struggle, and what we struggle for.”141 An established national
Black press could counter the “weight of odium and malignity” expressed by
the dominant white presses.142 It could also add a Black perspective to the
antislavery press. This latter point is especially important for understanding
how the convention delegates understood the role of the Black public sphere.
They appreciated, deeply, the work of Garrison and other white antislavery
advocates and their papers and publishers. Many delegates regularly
published in their journals. Yet the perspective was not the same. The
problem, they wrote, was that the “favorable feeling” of white abolitionists was
one of “human sympathy.”143 “Our friends sorrow with us,” they continued,

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

1847 National Convention, supra note 128, at 8.
Id. at 18.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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“because, they say we are unfortunate!” While better than the “antipathy”
shown by the dominant white press, neither antipathy nor sympathy reflected
equality and full citizenship. “[W]e must command something manlier than
sympathies. We must command the respect and admiration due men, who,
against fearful odds, are struggling steadfastly for their rights. This can only be
done through a Press of our own.”144 This was an argument for Black
autonomy as a necessary ingredient in the creation of full equality and
citizenship, insisting that the claiming of and battle for rights was itself an
essential part of racial equality. As would be the case in other Black
conventions, this richly textured understanding of the role of race-specific
institutions as a means of attaining the elimination of race prejudice would be
an important, if at times contested, basic principle.
In addition to advocating for a vibrant press, the conventions also advanced
an economic vision for Black Americans. One aspect of this vision reflected
a version of antebellum yeoman farmer ideology. For instance, in its Report
on Agriculture the 1847 Convention encouraged African Americans to seek
out farms and land they could work. Farming, they argued, was the best
pursuit to provide “freedom from undue care and anxiety about the
necessaries and comforts of life” and “to meet the real wants of life.”145
Farming, being the pursuit most directly connected with food and staples,
could best address the basic wants of life, and doing so they identified as a
basic aspect of freedom. For these reasons farming also enabled
independence. “The farmer is an independent man; the man of no other
pursuit is so much so.”146 For people long enslaved, the prospect of such
independence would have had strong appeal, and it fit well with a particular
image of the farmers’ democracy that many Americans of the time shared.
Another part of this ideology was the image of agriculture as a distinctly
egalitarian pursuit. “[A]n Agricultural life is open to all,” they wrote, “and
tends to equality in life” and is a means by which society can see “all castes
fade away[.]”147 The convention was especially receptive to wealthy abolitionist
Gerrit Smith’s recent gift to Black people of large tracts in upstate New York,
which they viewed as a means of achieving this level of freedom and equality.148
Despite the fact that, like many others in this period, the convention delegates
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29–30; see also JOHN STAUFFER, THE BLACK HEARTS OF MEN: RADICAL ABOLITIONISTS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RACE

land grants).

138–44 (2001) (describing the details and impact of Smith’s
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were swimming against the economic tide of American industrialization in
privileging yeoman farming, the basic idea that land and property were
essential for the formerly enslaved to secure independence, freedom, and
equality would continue to animate Black abolitionism and become a leading
principle of Reconstruction in the form of land distribution and the forty-acresand-a-mule movement.149 It also reflected a concern with economic equality
that is an important aspect of Black uplift ideology, which too often is
construed as having been focused mainly on the educational and professional
attainment of middle- and upper-class urban African Americans.

C. 1848 National Convention, Cleveland
The relationship between a broadly understood equality across civil society
and the structural nature of racial prejudice and oppression was further
developed the following year in the documents of the National Convention in
Cleveland. In its Address to the Colored People of the United States the 1848
Convention presented an intricate analysis of how race prejudice operated,
and explored they the complex aspects of Black resistance, setting forth some
key concepts on the nature of equality from Black abolitionism. First, the
Address acknowledged the persistence and insidiousness of white supremacy
and racial slavery: “The doctrine perseveringly proclaimed in high places in
church and state, that it is impossible for colored men to rise from ignorance
and debasement, to intelligence and respectability in this country, has made a
deep impression upon the public mind generally, and is not without its effect
upon us.”150 “We were not only slaves,” they continued, “but our ignorance
made us willing slaves.”151 The Convention sought to inspire Black
northerners to break free of the “despondency” and fatalism created by this
“gloomy doctrine” and inspire “our fellow-countrymen” to embrace the
“upward tendency of the oppressed throughout the world” toward the
“triumph of right over wrong, of freedom over slavery, and equality over
caste.”152 The recent progress of Black northerners showed the importance

149 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 104–
10, 308–10, 374–75 (1988) (discussing the impact of land redistribution principles and economic
liberty through farming on Reconstruction).
150 Report of the Proceedings of the Colored National Convention held at Cleveland, Ohio, on
Wednesday, September 6, 1848, at 17 (1848) [hereinafter 1848 National Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/items/show/280.
151 Id. at 18.
152 Id. at 17. The reference in the Address to freedom movements across the world shows the
importance of events in Europe and the Revolution of 1848 for Black leaders in the United States.
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of active efforts to claim rights and standing, to focus on education and
achievement, and to become active claimers of “political and social rights.”153
The point here was that the very act of asserting themselves, of claiming rights
across all spheres of society, would itself help defeat white supremacy’s grip
on the minds of both Black people and white people. Freedom and equality
were made, not given.
Second, the Address authors drew the connection between racial slavery
in the South and its effects on the “free” North. They made clear that slavery
itself was a brutal imposition of physical and sexual violence that led to “moral
death,” a total denial of personhood and that eliminated “all rights” and “all
privileges.”154 In the South, they wrote, “we are a murdered people.”155 Black
northerners were “far enough removed from the actual condition of the slave”
to recognize that their situation was not as horrific; indeed, that very fact placed
on them a responsibility to fight for “a speedy emancipation of our enslaved
fellow-countrymen.”156 They argued, however, that even though they were “not
slaves to individuals . . . in many respects we are the slaves of the
community.”157 The widespread race prejudice in the North, a Jim Crow
society that barred Black residents from many skilled trades, professions,
educational institutions, churches, social organizations, and from political
power, placed Black northerners in a caste system. To defeat slavery, they
argued, it was necessary to also defeat this caste system, to make equality a fact
on the ground in the north as well as the south.
The problem was how to do this. The answer, in part, was to seek
improvement as a race, to be race conscious in the pursuit of racial equality.
As the 1847 Convention had observed, white abolitionism, notwithstanding its
fervent advocacy for the end of slavery, included a tendency toward sympathy
or even pity that was inconsistent with equality. White abolitionists were also
hesitant in recognizing the problems of Black northerners and could be rather

Indeed, the abolition of colonial slavery by England, in 1833, and France, in 1848, and the
Republican movements across Europe in 1848 brought home the irony that the monarchical
Europeans were seeing a greater expression of freedom than were the heirs of the Spirit of 1776. For
a description of the influence of the 1848 European revolutions on abolition, see SINHA, supra note
16, at 363–71.
153 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 17.
154 Id. at 18.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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critical of their economic success.158 The 1848 Convention asked Black
northerners to embrace white abolitionist societies and join their fight to end
slavery. But they also stressed the need for Black organizations:
It will be a long time before we gain all our rights; and although it may
seem to conflict with our views of human brotherhood, we shall
undoubtedly for many years be compelled to have institutions of a
complexional character, in order to attain this very idea of human
brotherhood.159
This statement reflected the complex nature of Black activism for equality
in a culture of white supremacy, and is an early recognition of the role of race
consciousness as a means to attaining equality. Recall that the authors had
opened the Address by highlighting the context of white supremacy;160 race
consciousness was not something created by them but was a necessary
response by the oppressed race. Institutions like the Black conventions, the
Black press, and Black schools were essential precisely because white people
barred African Americans from those vital civic institutions.161 The delegates
still advised their Black audience and readers “to occupy memberships and
stations among white persons, and in white institutions, just so fast as our rights
are secured to us” but they also acknowledged that those rights would only be
secured through Black activism.162
The Convention considered another complicating aspect of activism in a
culture of subordination: the tension within Black communities of advocating
for higher social and economic achievement without at the same time
denigrating the current position of many Black workers. This was a point of
some contention in the convention, where some members feared that the call
for advancement into skilled trades and professions implied an elitist snub of
servants and unskilled labor.163 The Address of the Convention hedged on

158 PEASE & PEASE, supra note 17, at 14 (noting how white abolitionists Sarah Grimke, Theodore Weld,
and George Thompson found a subset of socioeconomically advantaged Black abolitionists to be
self-interested and ostentatious).
159 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 19.
160 Id. at 17 (“The doctrine perseveringly proclaimed in high places in church and state, that it is
impossible for colored men to rise from ignorance and debasement, to intelligence and respectability
in this country, has made a deep impression upon the public mind generally, and is not without its
effect upon us.”).
161 For the classic discussion of segregation in education, labor, business, professions, and churches in
the North, see LITWACK, supra note 44, at 113–213. See also STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, MORE
THAN FREEDOM: FIGHTING FOR BLACK CITIZENSHIP IN A WHITE REPUBLIC, 1829-1889, at 124–
33 (2012) (discussing battle over school segregation in antebellum Boston); HORTON & HORTON,
supra note 30, at 117–21 (discussing segregation in skilled professions, including medicine).
162 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 19.
163 See id. at 5 (recounting a debate over the 2d Resolution among delegates at the 1848 Convention).
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this point: “the Convention regarded those [unskilled] employments, though
right in themselves, as being, nevertheless, degrading to us as a class, and
therefore, counsel you to abandon them as speedily as possible . . . .”164 This
language attempted to negotiate the balance between individual and groups
experience. Unskilled labor is valued in itself at an individual level, yet has, in
aggregate, the effect of creating a racial stigma and reinforcing the very
assumptions of inferiority that caused white people to deny African Americans
entry into skilled positions. This was a difficult argument for the Convention
to make, given that so many Black northerners whom they were recruiting
were themselves forced to work as servants and took pride in their livelihood.
Still, the way the Convention addressed the topic reflected a deep
understanding of the relationship between the dominant ideology of individual
labor and the social reality of group subordination.
The Address authors then extended this point to express an idea of what
could be called mutual independence. Having skilled employment in
mechanical trades or in agriculture, they argued, would advance liberty,
equality, and social dignity for Black people.165 “[I]ndependence is an essential
condition of respectability. To be dependent, is to be degraded. Men may
pity us, but they cannot respect us.”166 Economic independence was an
essential condition of full and equal citizenship. Yet by embracing
independence they did not mean stark individualism. “We do not mean” they
continued,
that we can become entirely independent of all men; that would be absurd
and impossible, in the social state. But we mean that we must become
equally independent with other members of the community. That other
members of the community shall be as dependent upon us, as we upon
them.167
This was a model of an egalitarian independence, of independence as
mutuality. As it was, however, race prejudice and white supremacy prevented
this mutuality “in the social state.”168 White people, they observed, built the
houses, made the clothes, produced the food.169 This one-way dependency
prohibited “respectability”, that aspect of equal dignity so essential to full
equality.170 Moreover, the employments that Black workers did maintain were

164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
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too vulnerable to substitution. Unlike those white workers who provided
necessities, Black unskilled and servant labor could, and likely would, be
replaced: “What shall a large class of our fellow-countrymen do, when white
men find it economical to black their own boots, and shave themselves? What
will they do when white men learn to wait on themselves?”171
Throughout the Address and other materials of the convention the
delegates argued for a particular vision of freedom and equality. They
recognized how intimately intertwined were the achievement of full freedom
and broad-based equality. For them, equality was not achieved merely by legal
changes—those were necessary but not sufficient—but also by social and
economic achievement and diversification. As they put it in the Declaration
of Sentiments, equality included “equality of attainments,” an equality across
employments and social statuses.172 They also recognized that white
opposition to racial equality took place across a wide range of spheres, or what
they described as “civil, political, social, or religious” restrictions “in any
manner derogatory to the universal equality of man.”173 Importantly, the
Convention did not limit its concern to civil and political equality, but saw
equality in social and religious spheres as components of universal equality as
well. And if the achievement of equality required this broad-based approach,
it also required a communal identity, including in race-based organizations, to
coordinate, support, and inspire the necessary rights-claiming activism and
also to successfully lobby, advocate, and promote their cause to white
audiences.
The 1848 Convention was also a pivotal, if limited, moment for including
women and women’s rights as part of the convention process. The 1848
convention took place just a few months after the Seneca Falls and Rochester
Women’s Rights.174 Frederick Douglass, who had attended those conventions,
and Martin Delany, co-founder with Douglass of the North Star, advocated
for the Cleveland convention to adopt a statement supporting the rights of
women, and in particular that women be made full participants in the

171
172
173
174

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
MARTHA S. JONES, ALL BOUND UP TOGETHER: THE WOMAN QUESTION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN
PUBLIC CULTURE, 1830-1900, at 79–80 (2007).
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conventions. 175 At first this proposal was defeated in committee.176 On the
third day of the convention, Douglass and Delany arranged for a speech by
Rebecca Sanford, a white activist who had also attended the women’s rights
conventions, which was the first address to a Black convention by a woman.177
Enabling Sanford to address the convention itself took some parliamentary
maneuvering—as the convention minutes stated, the “Rules were suspended”
to allow “Mrs. Sanford” to address the body on “the Rights of Woman.”178 As
Martha Jones has observed, Sanford pitched her speech carefully, advocating
for the “Elective Franchise” and the “right of property in the marriage
covenant,” while also showing respect for women’s “duties”.179 Following
Sanford’s speech, the initial conflict over whether to approve the DouglassDelany Women’s Rights Resolution and the related issue of whether women
attendees were full convention members found a compromise when Charles
Langston and William Howard Day deftly asserted that the convention had
already recognized the right of women to participate with a resolution “making
‘all colored persons present, delegates to this Convention’” and that since
“they considered women persons” women were already full participants.180
The Convention then fully supported the resolution, which read: “Whereas,
we fully believe in the equality of the sexes, therefore, Resolved, That we
hereby invite females hereafter to take part in our deliberations.”181
The support for women’s rights at the convention, and the recognition of
at least some role for women as public participants and speakers, was an
important development in the convention movement and recognition of the
role that Black and white women had been playing in the abolitionist and
175 Id. at 79; see also LEIGH FOUGHT, WOMEN IN THE WORLD OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 156, 350
n.10 (2017) (describing Douglass’s and other Black men’s support for the freedom of women, acts
that included inviting Mrs. Sanford to speak at the Cleveland convention and promoting
universalizing language in the Cleveland convention resolution). On Douglass and Delany and the
founding of the North Star, see BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 191–94.
176 JONES, supra note 174, at 59.
177 Id.
178 Id.; 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 11.
179 JONES, supra note 174, at 59, 80 (quoting 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 11). The
rights that Sanford promoted—including right to suffrage and marital property—were prominent
claims made in the Declaration of Sentiments at the Seneca Falls Convention that she and Douglass
had just attended. See REPORT OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT SENECA
FALLS, N.Y., JULY 19TH AND 20TH, 1848, at 7–8 (1848) [hereinafter Seneca Falls Declaration of
Sentiments], https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbcmil.scrp4006702/?sp=11; see also CARLA L.
PETERSON, “DOERS OF THE WORD”, AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN SPEAKERS & WRITERS IN THE
NORTH (1830-1880) 101 (1995) (explaining how Sanford’s speech echoed the rhetoric of the Seneca
Falls convention).
180 JONES, supra note 174, at 59–60 (quoting 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 11).
181 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 17.
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moral reform movement up to that point.182 Martha Jones has described this
convention as a key part of the conceptual transformation of the role of Black
women: “[f]emale influence was giving way to women’s rights[.]”183 The formal
activities of convention movement, like much of the nineteenth-century public
sphere, was largely male.184 The abolitionist movement, however, had close
ties to the growing feminist movement.185 Scholars who have been reading the
state and national convention materials closely have been uncovering details
showing the influence of women, and particularly of Black women, on the
conventions.186 As was the case with abolitionism generally, women were
critically important to the Black abolitionist movement but at the same time
were severely limited in their public roles and often had their claims to equal
rights and suffrage shunted aside or limited to brief acknowledgements at these
public fora.187 But, as Martha Jones has pointed out, the parallel African
American moral reform societies, which had grown out of the 1830s
convention movement, did include active leadership roles for Black women,

182 As the editors of the Colored Convention Project put it, as businesswomen, editors, teachers, cooks,
and boarding-house proprietors (among many other roles), Black women, too, contributed to
campaigns for Black social, legal, educational, and labor equality. The newspaper work,
entrepreneurial activism, and political commitments of Mary Ann Shadd Cary, Elizabeth Gloucester,
Julia Williams Garnet and Frances E. W. Harper, for example, illustrate the ways in which Black
women challenged traditional beliefs about women’s place in public society and embodied the values
of Colored Conventions beyond delegate appointment. P. Gabrielle Foreman, Sarah Patterson, &
Jim Casey, Introduction to the Colored Conventions Movement: An Overview of Nineteenth-

Century
Black
Political
History
and Organizing, COLORED CONVENTION PROJECT, https://coloredconventions.org/introductionmovement/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
183 JONES, supra note 174, at 60. The idea here is that, prior to the late 1840s, Black women had been
seen by men as adjuncts to the public meetings and organizations advancing racial equality, exercising
their influence on their communities within their traditional roles. After 1848, however, it had
become clear to many Black leaders that women’s rights were part of the general struggles for African
Americans. Both sentiments would continue to influence the convention movement. See generally
id. at 60–85.
184 SPIRES, supra note 10, at 89 (“While the state conventions, like their national counterparts, rarely
recognized women as delegates and in some cases explicitly bared them, women were deeply involved
in [the] larger constellation of events, from commenting on the convention process in newspapers to
providing housing and meals and raising funds to printing and circulating convention documents.”)
185 On the connections between the abolitionist movement and the women’s rights movement, see
SINHA, supra note 16, at 266–298.
186 See, e.g., Samantha de Vera, ‘We the Ladies . . . Have Been Deprived of a Voice’: Uncovering Black
Women’s Lives through the Colored Conventions Archive, 27 19: INTERDISC. STUD. LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY 1 (2018) (describing activism of Black nineteenth-century women, including
how the minutes of the Colored Conventions demonstrate their leadership roles as people
independent from male relatives).
187 On women’s participation in and relationship to the abolitionist movement, see SINHA, supra note
16, at 266–89 and JONES, supra note 174, at 1–117.
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at least at the local level.188 The public recognition at the 1848 National
Convention was followed by a local meeting of the Philadelphia African
American Antislavery Society the following month at which Black and white
women activists served in leadership roles, and then a few months later in
Columbus where women delegates to the state convention advocated for
women’s educational rights.189 In these ways the convention movement
provided some openings for women and for the expansion of rights claims to
include women’s rights as well.
One other aspect of the 1848 Convention is worth noting as we consider
how the Black convention movement reflected ideas of rights and
constitutionalism. The Declaration of Sentiments included a Resolution
supporting the organization of Vigilant Committees to encourage and train
African Americans “to measure arms with assailants without and invaders
within . . . .”190 Given modern debates over the role of a right to bear arms as
part of Reconstruction, it is relevant to note here that, while arms bearing and
training are both assumed and encouraged by the Convention, they stress the
context of both military participation (“we find ourselves far behind the
military tactics of the civilized world”) and collective militia defense of
communities.191 This made sense for Black northerners, who, even before the
draconian Fugitive Salve Act of 1850, were at risk of assaults by slave

188 JONES, supra note 174, at 47.
189 Id. at 76–77, 80–81. At the Columbus convention, women, led by Jane Merritt and apparently
supported by Charles Langston and William Day, forced the male conventioneers to recognize them
as delegates and not just attendees, as the male organizers apparently had originally planned. Id. at
80–81. Jones at one point refers to the convention’s location as Cincinnati, but as her note references
make clear, she is discussing the Columbus convention. Id. at 236 nn.89–90; see also Minutes and
Address of the State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio, Convened at Columbus, January
10th,
11th,
12th,
&
13th,
1849,
at
14–15
(1849),
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/items/show/247 (detailing Jane Merritt’s resolution and the
expressed support or opposition of male members of the convention); SPIRES, supra note 10, at 107
(explaining how Merritt and other women pushed for the male delegates in Ohio to recognize their
participation, including by threatening to boycott the Convention of 1849); PETERSON, supra note
179, at 101.
190 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 12, 16.
191 The U.S. Supreme Court and Justice Thomas cited a Reconstruction-era Black convention and the
Black press in support of the right to bear arms in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771
n.18 (2010); id. at 847–50 (Thomas, J., concurring). For my own views on how the Court, and the
scholars the Court relied on, misinterpret the African American source materials, see James W. Fox
Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. REV. 675, 702–08 (2016).
See also SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 167–210 (2006) (discussing nature of the right to bear
arms as seen in Reconstruction-era laws, discussions, and debates).
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“catchers” (kidnappers) and also mobbing by white northerners.192 Selfdefense, including by arms, was an aspect of life for Black people in the
north,193 but we see here that it is framed collectively and communally. As we
will see, this collective dynamic would continue to be an aspect of arms bearing
to the extent it appears in many of the conventions.

D. Ohio State Convention, 1851
By the 1840s and 1850s, Black activists had established vibrant and regular
conventions in several states. While many of the topics of these conventions
focused on state and local matters, many of those concerns directly implicated
questions of national and constitutional import, such as equal rights, suffrage,
and the fundamental privileges of citizenship.194 Many of those discussions
paralleled what was debated in the national conventions—as Howard Bell
described it, the convention delegates:
[r]epeatedly . . . called upon each other to be temperate and to become skilled
laborers or farmers opposed to unskilled laborers; repeatedly they requested
access to the public schools; repeatedly they encouraged the development of
a Negro press and a literate, interested public; but above all, they hammered
home the necessity of acquiring full citizenship—including the suffrage.
195

While several of the state conventions from this period present excellent
resources for these debates, two conventions from Ohio are particularly
significant in their elucidation of the constitutional ideas and aspirations of the
Black public sphere at the time. In part because Ohio, despite the Black
Codes that fueled the Cincinnati mobbing in 1829, had for years been a center
of the underground railroad and anti-slavery activism, and in part because
northern Ohio, and especially Oberlin College, had long encouraged full
rights and education for African Americans, by the late 1840s Ohio had a
surfeit of young Black activists, including John Mercer and Charles Langston,
William Day, and H. Ford Douglas, who would become leaders in the
national movement.196 The repeal of many of the restrictive Ohio Black Laws

192

See PEASE & PEASE, supra note 17, at 206–32 (discussing fugitive slave kidnappings and Black
resistance strategies before and after Fugitive Slave Act of 1850); id. at 233–35 (discussing antebellum

white race mobbing).
See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 161, at 179–80 (describing Black Bostonians’ increasingly militant
self-defense response to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).
194 On the state conventions during this period, see Bell, supra note 11, at 181–205 (describing the state
conventions that Black activists organized between 1848 and 1859).
195 Howard H. Bell, Some Reform Interests of the Negro During the 1850’s as Reflected in State
Conventions, 21 PHYLON 173, 181 (1960).
196 State Convention Proceedings, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 214–15. Douglas’s name is often misspelled
with a double “s.”
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in 1849, and the passage of the federal Fugitive Slave Act in 1850, together
shifted the focus of the conventions of the early 1850s to a more national
focus.197 The Convention of 1851, in particular, presents an example of
constitutional discourse that nicely reflects the scope of ideas in the Black
public sphere from this period.
The thirty-nine African American leaders from across Ohio assembled in
the Second Baptist Church in Columbus in January 1851 and discussed many
issues central to Black activism, from opposition to the recent federal Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850, to legal and customary bars on equal access for Black
residents to public accommodations, to promoting antislavery societies and
churches.198 On the second day, discussion turned to the meaning of the
United States Constitution. H. Ford Douglas rose to support a Resolution
that “it is the opinion of this Convention, that no colored man can consistently
vote under the United States Constitution[.]”199 This argument sparked an
extended debate over the meaning of the antebellum Constitution for African
Americans. Douglas argued forcefully that “the Constitution of the United
States is pro-slavery, considered so by those who framed it, and construed to
that end ever since its adoption.”200 Douglas presented the Garrisonian
covenant-with-death view of the Constitution, which, he argued, was only
reinforced by the recent Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.201 According to him, the
constitutional guarantee to keep open the slave trade until 1808 was a “guilty
197 Id. at 214–17.
198 Minutes of the State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio, Convened at Columbus, Jan. 15th,
16th, 17th, and 18th, 1851 [hereinafter 1851 Ohio Convention], at 6–18,
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/a65f7f5d8474b86eca74df928f0e3a8b.pdf
(setting forth minutes and resolutions of convention).
199 Id. at 8. Douglas’s last name is incorrectly spelled in the document by adding an extra “s.” Douglas,
a self-educated nineteen-year-old barber and activist from Cleveland, would become known for taking
bold positions: later in the 1850s he became a leading radical voice in Black abolitionism and
advocate for emigration. See generally Robert L. Harris, Jr., H. Ford Douglas: Afro-American
Antislavery Emigrationist, 62 J. NEGRO HIST. 217 (1977) (describing Douglas’s involvement in the
Ohio free Black community). Douglas also would serve as one of the few Black officers in the Civil
War, and died in 1865 from malaria that he contracted in Mississippi during the war.
200 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 8.
201 On William Garrison’s position that the Constitution was a “covenant with death”, see JACK M.
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 5 (2011)
(discussing Garrison’s view that the Constitution “was born in sin and incorrigible”); Paul Finkelman,
Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How It Was Made, 32 PROLOGUE MAG.
230 (2000) (discussing Garrison’s position that the Constitution “was the result of a terrible bargain
between freedom and slavery”). On Garrison’s disunionism, constitutionalism, and politics in the
context and its relation to other versions of abolitionism, see SINHA, supra note 16, at 417–78
(detailing Garrison’s anti-constitutional views and call for a fugitive slave rebellion). The fullest
contemporary statement of Garrisonian anti-constitutionalism is given in WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE
CONSTITUTION: A PROSLAVERY COMPACT (3d ed. 1856).
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contract” against the very liberty Americans so valued; the fugitive slave clause
had empowered Congress to make all citizens participants “in the horrible
system of human bondage” and had “shroud[ed] our country in blackness,”
to the point of undermining the very legal rights like habeas corpus and trial
by jury that the document supposedly protected.202
Douglas’s claim was bold not only in its Garrisonian rejection of the
Constitution, but also because by condemning all political participation in the
unholy American system, he challenged the very foundation of the
Convention, which was its advocacy for securing the right to vote for Black
men in the upcoming state constitutional convention. His speech sparked a
strong response from William Howard Day, who countered that Douglas
made the same error as “many others who discuss this question” (meaning
Garrisonians) “of making the construction of the Constitution of the United
States, the same as the Constitution itself.”203 He did not dispute the unjustness
of “the proslavery action of this government, nor . . . the aid which the
Supreme Court of the United States has given to Slavery[.]”204 “[B]ut,” he
continued, “that is not the Constitution—they are not [the rules] under which
I vote.”205 Many people, he observed, “attempt[ ] to justify the worst of
iniquities” by citing the Bible, but nobody in the deeply Protestant
communities the delegates were part of would “discard the Bible” because it
was wrongly interpreted.206 Day further countered Douglas’s textual
references: if the Constitution “says it was framed to ‘establish justice,’ it, of
course, is opposed to injustice; if it says plainly no person shall be [‘]deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’—I suppose it means it,
and I shall avail myself of the benefit of it.”207 For Day, the Constitution
provided a path to liberty that he would not ignore or deny:
I consider every instrument precious which guaranties to me liberty. I
consider the Constitution the foundation of American liberties, and wrapping
myself in the flag of the nation, I would plant myself upon that Constitution,
202 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 8–9.
203 Id. at 10. Day was a recent graduate of Oberlin and would, in 1853, help start the Aliened American,
the first Black newspaper west of the Alleghenies and a leading voice in abolition. See PEASE &
PEASE, supra note 17, at 118 (stating that Day published the Aliened American in response to calls
for the establishment of a western newspaper). He also challenged segregation in public
accommodations in Michigan, losing in a state supreme court of Republican justices, in Day v. Owen,
5 Mich. 520, 520–28 (1858). See KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 158–63 (2014) (describing Day’s legal battle in the Michigan Supreme
Court and the decision’s impact on the abolitionist movement).
204 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 10.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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and using the weapons they have given me, I would appeal to the American
people for the rights thus guarantied.
208

For Douglas the question was less idealistic and more practical: “The
gentleman may wrap the stars and stripes of his country around him forty
times, if possible, and with the Declaration of Independence in one hand, and
the Constitution of our common country in the other,” but he still would have
no protection against the slavecatcher who, under full protection of federal law
and the Constitution, could capture him.209 Day’s Constitution of justice and
liberty, existing in the ether, was not, for Douglas, the Constitution that
mattered. The Constitution that mattered was the one enforced, on the
ground, upon their bodies, and with little chance of repeal.
The debate was not finished, however. Charles Langston, recently of
Oberlin and who, along with his brother John Mercer Langston, was fast
becoming a leading Black abolitionist in Ohio, rose to argue a third position.
Although his brother had just that morning proclaimed that the Fugitive Slave
Law was unconstitutional using reasoning much like Day’s,210 Charles Langston
took a different tack:
I perfectly agree with the gentleman from Cuyahoga (Mr. Douglass, [sic]) . . .
that the United States’ Constitution is pro-slavery. It was made to foster and
uphold that abominable, vampirish and bloody system of American slavery.
The highest judicial tribunals of the country have so decided. Members, while
in the Convention and on returning to their constituents, declared that Slavery
was one of the interests sought to be protected by the Constitution. It was so
understood and administered all over the country. But whether the
Constitution is pro-slavery, and whether colored men ‘can consistently vote
under that Constitution,’ are two very distinct questions; and while I would
answer the former in the affirmative, I would not . . . answer the latter in the
negative. I would vote under the United States Constitution on the same
principle, (circumstances being favorable), that I would call on every slave,
from Maryland to Texas, to arise and assert their liberties, and cut their
masters’ throats if they attempt again to reduce them to slavery.
211

208 Id.
209 Id.
210 John Mercer Langston described the Fugitive Slave Law as “a hideous deformity in the garb of law
. . . . [T]his enactment—unworthy [of] the name of law—reverses [Blackstone’s] definition [of law] by
prohibiting what is right, and commanding what is wrong.” Id. at 6. And not only was it against the
principles of law, but it “kill[ed] alike, the true spirit of the American Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution, and the palladium of our liberties.” Id. at 6–7. It was unconstitutional, argued
Langston, because it denied habeas, granted final judicial authority to low-level commissioners, and
essentially denied due process by bribing the commissioners with payment for deciding in favor of
slavery and prohibiting defendants from presenting facts and witnesses. Id. at 7.
211 Id. at 11. Charles Langston’s embrace of violence as a legitimate self-defense against slavery was also
reflected in his support for the Christiana resistance action against fugitive slave captures in Maryland,

April 2021]

BLACK ABOLITIONISM

317

Langston argued for political action as a form of resistance. He refused to
adopt a Panglossian view of the Constitution itself, a position that required
Day to divorce constitutional text from constitutional practice and culture and
to elide some aspects of the text in favor of others. Yet Langston also rejected
Douglas’s model, which seemed to be political abdication (Douglas was soon
to be a leading advocate for Black-led emigrationism212). For Langston, one
could simultaneously proclaim the moral illegitimacy of the Constitution while
also engaging constitutionalism as a strategy. For him, suffrage was a tool for
resistance and a means to achieving their common goal of liberty and full and
equal citizenship. As he said in conclusion, “I hope . . . that colored men will
vote, or do anything else under the Constitution, that will aid in effecting our
liberties, and in securing our political, religious and intellectual elevation.”213
This debate over constitutional principle, advocacy, and practice was held
at a crucial time in our constitutional history. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
marked the nadir in antebellum human rights and was, for Black abolitionists
especially, a clear indication that law and legal institutions were fully
proslavery. This was a time of constitutional crisis, when the Constitution was
used by all branches of the federal government to enforce slavery nationally,
and when the descendants of Africans who were not enslaved had before them
the difficult choice of whether to abandon the country and support emigration
(as H. Ford Douglas and others advocated) or to fight, both politically and
physically, for their place in a country and constitution that were increasingly
set against them. What could the Constitution possibly mean in this context?
How could African Americans find a constitutional identity in such a society?
What place did Christian nonviolence and moral suasion have against the
forcible kidnapping and enslavement of Black northerners and perpetuation
and extension of slavery? If America had never been a just, constitutional
society (a point on which all three of the speakers above agreed), what would
such a society actually look like and how could these delegates imagine such a
place?
None of these questions had easy answers. But the very fact that the
delegates at the convention were debating them shows a deep engagement with
the foundational concepts of constitutionalism and constitutional

and his later defense of fugitive slaves in Oberlin. See STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE:
RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON TRIAL 129, 229–47 (2010) (describing Langston’s
involvement with the Christiana defense team and Oberlin’s embrace of escaped slaves).
212 See generally Harris, supra note 196 (discussing Douglas’s involvement in the Black-led
emigrationism movement).
213 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 11.
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interpretation at precisely the time when constitutional justice stood at its
nadir. One response, of course, was to stress the importance of a citizenship
of full participation by claiming the right of suffrage, as Charles Langston had
advocated. The 1851 Convention did just that. In a detailed petition to the
Ohio Constitutional Convention, which was meeting to revise the state
constitution, the Black convention delegates demanded that the white
Convention “strik[e] out the word ‘white’” from the state constitution’s section
on suffrage.214 This petition presented a full-throated, fully developed
argument in favor of the right of suffrage. It asserted suffrage as a basic natural
right for all consensual governments, and linked that point to both the
Preamble of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence.215 The petition also argued that natural-born citizenship was
implicit in the federal Constitution’s Naturalization Clause, and that,
combined with Article IV’s Privilege and Immunities Clause, the federal
Constitution required the extension of voting to all citizens — that is, all free
persons born in the United States (the convention also opposed slavery, but
since Ohio was a free state their focus here was on suffrage as a right of free
Black men in Ohio).216 The petition further argued that the full privileges of
citizenship were also owed them because the full duties of citizenship were
expected and in fact performed: Black Americans paid taxes, fought in wars,
and otherwise performed the duties and showed the allegiance to government
that correlated with rights to suffrage and political participation—as the petition
to the white convention asked, “have we not a just claim to the same rights with
you?”217 This petition, then, set forth many of the main constitutional and
political arguments in favor of equal suffrage, arguments which would over
time become those of, first, the Radical Republicans in 1866-67 and then the
full Republican party by 1869-70. They reflected a radical re-reading of the
antebellum constitution as not only an anti-slavery but also a pro-equality
document, and also a deeper commitment of political philosophy that would
steer the course of constitutional amendment. And while the 1851 Ohio
Convention was by no means the only source for these arguments, its
214 Id. at 19. On matters of racial equality, Ohio in this period was marked by ambivalence, on the one
hand removing older anti-Black laws and opposing the federal Fugitive Slave Act, and on the other
hand enthusiastically retaining the restriction of suffrage to white men. See generally Paul Finkelman,
The Strange Career of Race Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 373
(2004) (surveying the complex legal history of race in antebellum Ohio); Barbara A. Terzian, Ohio’s
Constitutions: An Historical Perspective, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 372–75 (2004) (discussing the
debate regarding African American rights and privileges at the 1850 Ohio constitutional convention).
215 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 20–21.
216 Id. at 20.
217 Id. at 22.
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documents reflect as well as any both the constitutional debates and the
constitutional arguments developing in the antebellum Black public sphere.218
The 1851 Ohio Convention, like the many similar state and national
conventions held by Black northerners from 1830 through early
Reconstruction, provided Black leaders and activists a forum to share ideas,
debate strategies, and engage as a community in forming and reforming their
identities as Black American citizens. In doing so, they also explored the
meaning of many of the concepts that we now consider foundational to our
Constitution and constitutional culture, from the meaning of freedom to the
nature and structure of equality. They debated the role of basic institutions
like religion and education in helping to create freedom to sustain white
supremacy. They articulated the intimate connections between racial slavery
and race prejudice and showed clearly how the Jim Crow North was a
manifestation of the nation’s support of slavery in the South and its history of
slavery in the North. They described their experience in the “free” North as
a state of “nominal freedom” and “half slavery,” rejecting the dangerous binary
of freedom/slavery that too easily assumed that freedom was sufficiently
realized with the absence of legal slavery. Instead, by closely detailing the
problems and barriers confronting Black northerners, the conventions
imagined a full freedom that engaged all “civil, political, religious, and social”
rights and institutions. They also struggled over questions of race
consciousness and “complexional” institutions as a means to achieving a
society free from racial prejudice. They even, if fleetingly and insufficiently,
considered the liberty and equality of women as part of the same struggle for
full citizenship. All of these ideas, percolating as they were in an era of the
legal entrenchment of white supremacy, would be ready to fertilize the
constitutional soil after the Civil War.

218 The 1852 Convention made similar points. Following up on the failure of the white Constitutional
Convention to end racially restricted suffrage, the 1852 Convention included a resolution stating:
“[W]e claim our rights at the hands of this government, not only because we are native born American
citizens, but because our ancestors and ourselves have contributed to the wealth, honor, liberty,
prosperity[,] and independence of this country.” Proceedings of the Convention, of the Colored
Freemen of Ohio, Held in Cincinnati, January 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19, at 7 [hereinafter 1852 Ohio
Convention],
https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/files/original/d71e2c32134ac173b2782d59587e20ba.pdf.
Following the convention, John Mercer Langston wrote a memorial on behalf of the convention to
the state legislature, which it accepted in 1854, in which he set forth many of the arguments in favor
of equal voting rights contained in the 1851 convention’s petition. See Memorial of J. Mercer
Langston to the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, June, 1854, State Convention Proceedings
vol. 1, supra note 11, at 298–303 (arguing “that it is unjust, and anti-democratic, impolitic and
ungenerous to withhold from [Black Americans] the right of suffrage”).
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IV. ANTICIPATING RECONSTRUCTION: NATIONAL CONVENTION
(SYRACUSE) OF 1864
The Civil War changed the dynamic for Black abolitionism. It united the
movement for full citizenship and radical resistance and suspended the need
for Black Americans to consider emigration. By October 1864, the progress
toward a Union victory, the Senate’s passage of the draft of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and pay equalization in the army had given Black leaders some
significant hope that victory in war would produce Black freedom and equality.
Yet the stalling of the amendment in the House and the Republicans’ tepid
embrace of it during the fall election campaign also had Black leaders attuned
to the need for continued Black activism in advocating the rights of Black
Americans.219 In this mixed climate of hope and trepidation Black leaders in
the North called a national convention to meet in Syracuse in October for the
purpose of founding a new national civil rights organization. The National
Convention of Colored Men comprised a who’s who of Black leaders of the
period.220 Fredrick Douglass served as president.221 Henry Highland Garnet
was also present, having helped call the convention, but his participation also
reflected an uneasy truce after many years of tension between Garnet and
Douglass and between Garnet’s supporters and other leaders.222 Many other

219 On the background of the drafting and passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, see TSESIS, supra
note 4, at 37–48 (discussing the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment); ZIETLOW, THE
FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR, supra note 70, at 108–29 (describing James Ashley’s role in the passage
of the Thirteenth Amendment).
220 For general biographical background on many Black leaders and activists from this period, including
many who attended the 1864 National Convention, see generally SINHA, supra note 164; QUARLES,
supra note 121; ERIC FONER, FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS
DURING RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1996).
221 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 8. See also BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 440 (“Virtually
every major black religious, political, literary, or community leader attended [the convention].”).
222 Douglass and Garnet fought fiercely over the question of emigration and Black-led colonization,
which Garnet supported, throughout the 1850s, but they also appear to have maintained a mutual
respect during this period. See BLIGHT, supra note 10994, at 222–23, 303–04. The conflicts over
Garnet’s colonization efforts emerged at the end of the convention in a debate over Richard Cain’s
motion to recognize Garnet’s organization, the African Civilization Society, for its work on Black
education; George Downing in particular objected, calling the organization “the child of prejudice”
for its proto-Black nationalist positions. 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 26. Downing
had long been a fervent critic of Garnet’s emigrationism, and Garnet apparently felt the wealthy
businessman Downing had become divorced from the concerns of the common man. See HUGH
DAVIS, “WE WILL BE SATISFIED WITH NOTHING LESS”: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE
FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION 24–25 (2011) (describing the
acrimonious debate between Downing and Garnet on emigration, the African Civilization Society,
and the headquarters of the National Equal Rights League). Given that some of these long-felt
conflicts were still so raw, it is all the more impressive that the convention was so productive.
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leading abolitionists, as well as those who would become leaders of
Reconstruction, joined them, including: George Downing (successful
restaurant owner from Rhode Island who would become manager of the
congressional dining room and de facto lobbyist for Black interests);223 William
Nesbit and Octavius Catto (who would lead equal rights activities in
Pennsylvania);224 John Mercer Langston (founder of Howard Law School,
minister to Haiti, and congressman);225 John Rock (first Black member of the
Supreme Court bar);226 William Wells Brown (well-known novelist and
lecturer);227 George Ruffin (who would become the first Black to graduate from
Harvard Law School and also the first African American judge);228 Francis

223

224

1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See BLIGHT, supra note 109, at
474 (referring to Downing’s biography and discussing his work with Frederick Douglass in leading a
meeting of Black leaders with Andrew Johnson in 1866); Kantrowitz, supra note 161, at 348–49
(discussing Downing’s importance as coordinator of congressional lobbying on behalf of Black
Americans). Downing remains under-studied. The main biography is the dated work,
WASHINGTON, S. A. M, GEORGE THOMAS DOWNING: SKETCH OF HIS LIFE AND TIMES (1910).
Thankfully the website, blackpast.org, has been posting important work on Black leaders and other
aspects of African American history. See Colin McBride, George T. Downing (1819-1903),
BLACKPAST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/downing-george-t1819-1903/ (providing general biography).
1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 5 (listing delegates). See DAVIS, supra note 219, at
28–29, 58 (discussing Nesbit’s equal rights work and congressional lobbying efforts); Hugh Davis,

The Pennsylvania State Equal Rights League and the Northern Black Struggle for Equality: 18641877, 126 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 611 (2002) (exploring history of Pennsylvania Equal

225

226

227

228

Rights League and work of Nesbit, Catto, and others); Villanova University, Falvey Memorial Library,
The Equal Rights League and Voting Suffrage, in exhibit A Great Thing for our People: The Institute
for Colored Youth in the Civil War, https://exhibits.library.villanova.edu/institute-coloredyouth/community-moments/equal-rights-league-and-suffrage/ (discussing work of Nesbit and Catto
in lobbying for the Fourteenth Amendment on behalf of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights League).
1864 National Convention, supra note 124124, at 6 (listing delegates). See William Cheek & Aimee
Lee Cheek, John Mercer Langston: Principle and Politics, in BLACK LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY, supra note 90, at 103, 112–26 (discussing Langston’s career from the end of the Civil War
through the 1890s); Shirley Yee, John Mercer Langston (1829-1897), BLACKPAST (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/langston-john-mercer-1829-1897/
(providing
general biography).
1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See Kantrowitz, supra note 161,
at 227–29, 347 (discussing Rock’s early career as an activist and doctor and his later admission to the
Supreme Court bar as a lawyer in 1865); Victor Okocha, John S. Rock (1825-1866), BLACKPAST
(Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/rock-john-s-1825-1866/
(providing general biography).
1864 National Convention, supra note 121, at 4 (listing delegates). For an excellent general biography
of Brown, see EZRA GREENSPAN, WILLIAM WELLS BROWN: AN AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE (2014).
See also id. at 406–08 (discussing Brown’s participation at the 1864 convention).
1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See also J. Clay Smith, Jr.,

Freedom's Birthplace: The Making of George Lewis Ruffin, the First Black Law Graduate of Harvard
University, 39 HOWARD L.J. 201 (1995-1996) (providing biography of Ruffin with an emphasis on
his legal and political career).
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Cardozo (the first Black statewide office holder as Secretary of State in South
Carolina in 1868);229 Richard H. Cain (state senator and then congressman
from South Carolina);230 and Abraham Galloway (Union spy and then political
leader and state senator in Reconstruction North Carolina).231 And despite it
being a call for colored men, at least two women attended the National
Convention, including the writer and activist Francis Ellen Watkins Harper,
who addressed the convention.232
The confluence of these and many other accomplished delegates and
attendees made this Convention one of the most important civil rights
meetings of the nineteenth century. It was also incredibly productive. By
founding the National Equal Rights League, the Convention set in motion
what would become an extensive civic and political organization in many states
that pressed for equal rights laws and suffrage nationally and in state
legislatures. Despite their brief life and constant financial difficulties, these
organizations helped establish schools, community aid, and other activities
central to supporting freedom day-to-day, and they held a series of local and
state meetings and conventions from which were issued important petitions
and letters to white legislators and to Black communities. The Equal Rights
League in effect established the groundwork and precedent for what would
become the Black civil society movement that would later battle Jim Crow.233

1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See also W. Lewis Burke, PostReconstruction Justice: The Prosecution and Trial of Francis Lewis Cardozo, 53 S. C. L. REV. 361,
366–71 (2002) (providing biographical information on Cardozo); FONER, supra note 149, at 351–53
(discussing Black leaders in statewide offices in South during Reconstruction, including Cardozo).
230 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See also Bernard E. Powers, Jr.,
Richard
Harvey
Cain,
in
SOUTH
CAROLINA
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2016),
athttps://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/cain-richard-harvey/.
231 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 4 (listing delegates). See generally DAVID S. CECELSKI,
THE FIRE OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM GALLOWAY & THE SLAVES’ CIVIL WAR (2012) (providing
general biography of Galloway). See also id. at 129–57 (discussing Galloway’s preparation for and
participation at the 1864 convention).
232 Frances Ellen Watkins Harper addressed the convention at the end of the third day. 1864 National
Convention, supra note 124, at 25. Edmonia Highgate also addressed the convention, on the second
day. Id. at 15. See also CECELSKI, supra note 228, at 143 (discussing Highgate’s and Harper’s
participation at the convention).
233 Davis, supra note 219, at 22; FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 149, at 27. The convention
movement and Equal Rights Leagues dissipated somewhat with the Fifteenth Amendment and the
shifting of efforts of Black leaders to working within party structures. Nevertheless, conventions
continued to be held, and the civil society program initiated in Syracuse was at least the precursor, if
not the direct ancestor, to W.E.B. DuBois’s Niagara Movement and the NAACP. See P. Gabrielle
Foreman,
Sarah
Patterson
&
Jim
Casey,
Introduction
to
the
Colored
Conventions Movement, COLORED CONVENTIONS PROJECT, https://coloredconventions.org/intro
duction-movement/.
229
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In addition to establishing the Equal Rights League, the Convention also
issued two documents that presented the collective feelings and thoughts of
these leaders from around the country. One of the Convention’s main
documents was styled a Declaration of Wrongs and Rights.234 The first six
paragraphs listed the harms the authors believed African Americans had
suffered.235 Steeped in slave narratives and other sentimental literature before
the war, Black people and their white allies perhaps did not need a detailed
listing of the injustices of slavery. Instead, the authors presented a set of
categories that defined for them unfreedom. The document reads like a
catalogue of the techniques of despotism and domination. The authors
declared, first, that Black Americans had been denied “natural rights” and
“privileges and advantages freely accorded to other men” by “brute force.”236
The oppressing class had taunted them as being inferior, ignorant, cowardly,
and incapable of self-government, yet they denied them the means of
improvement through religion, education, literacy, self-sufficiency, and a
“musket on the battle-field.”237 The authors then described how their rights of
families, homes, and labor had been subject to the lash, to rape, to slave
auctions, and to desolation.238 The listing concluded with wrongs felt more by
Black northerners than by the enslaved: the wage disparities in the military,
the denial of suffrage, limited access to trial by jury, and exclusion from
educational institutions.239
In a short space of six paragraphs the convention summarized the wrongs
of slavery and segregation. By combining the wrongs of northern segregation
with the harms of slavery, the delegates made a strong statement to their
northern white audience about the inextricable relationship between slavery
and racial caste. This listing also served as a set of categories essential to
freedom—family, labor, bodily integrity, safety, shelter, education, religion,
arms bearing, voting, jury trials. Moreover, the document asserted that denial
of these rights was done forcibly by fellow Americans, thus implying a guilt
and responsibility on the part of white Americans not just to eliminate the

234
235
236
237
238
239

1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 41.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
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wrongs, but to re-set the starting positions.240 This was, at bottom, the basis for
a demand for equality of opportunity as an affirmative principle.
Having set the stage, the delegates quickly stated their basic rights claims.
Just as with the list of wrongs, they first declared something many white
sympathizers would clearly agree with: an immediate end to slavery because
“all men are born free and equal.”241 Next, reflecting the ideas developed in
conventions and the Black public sphere over the prior 25 years, the delegates
asserted not only a right to remain in America (a right of nativity and also an
anti-colonization statement) and to claim to American citizenship (“for here
we were born, for this country our fathers and our brothers have fought”) and
also a right to “the full enjoyment of enfranchised manhood, and its
dignities.”242 Then, in the third paragraph, they come to the broadest statement
of rights in the document:
[A]s citizens of the Republic, we claim the rights of other citizens. We claim
that we are, by right, entitled to respect; that due attention should be given to
our needs; that proper rewards should be given for our services, and that the
immunities and privileges of all other citizens and defenders of the nation’s
honor should be conceded to us. We claim the right to be heard in the halls
of Congress; and we claim our fair share of the public domain, whether
acquired by purchase, treaty, confiscation, or military conquest.
243

This deceptively short statement did a lot of work for the delegates. It was
significant that they set up the paragraph with the assertion, in the second
paragraph, of a historically grounded right to full membership. As we saw
throughout the Black convention movement, this was a foundational point in
African American claims to equal respect and worth. This citizenship claim,
based as it was on African Americans’ long history in the country and right of
nativity, could have morphed into an ascriptive nativism not uncommon
among white Americans.244 Yet significantly, the Syracuse delegates avoided
such moves, instead simply making their own historical claim to belonging.
Moreover, they did so in order to claim the “full enjoyment of enfranchised

240 As Hugh Davis observed, the Convention delegates were quite careful to “find some balance between
chastising white America for its long history of racial injustice and hypocrisy and recognizing that the
rights they sought could only be attained with the assistance of sympathetic whites.” Davis, supra
note 219, at 21.
241 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 42.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See, e.g., Jay Rubin, Black Nativism: The European Immigrant in Negro Thought, 1830-1860, 39
PHYLON 193 (1978) (citing some instances of this nativism in speeches from Black leaders but noting
the general rejection of the nativist Know Nothings by Black abolitionists and that African American
attitudes were shaped more by the extent to which immigrant communities adopted American ideas
of white supremacy).
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manhood, and its dignities.”245 Interestingly they did not simply claim a right
to suffrage but also described the “full enjoyment” of suffrage and “its
dignities.” For these delegates suffrage stood for more than just the political
power—although that was certainly important. Suffrage also meant a dignified
membership, a recognition, a showing of respect. Here we begin to see how,
for Black leaders, having the ballot, and the access to political organization and
power that came with it, were social characteristics as much as they were
political assets.
This idea of dignified membership helps us grasp the full meaning of the
third paragraph, quoted above. First, notice what the paragraph does not do.
The authors had just previously listed, in the paragraphs depicting the wrongs
and injuries, the problems one would expect to be followed with a thenstandard set of civil rights claims: right to marriage, rights to contract and
property ownership, access to courts. Indeed, these would come to be the
rights protected by Congress’s 1866 Civil Rights Act.246 Yet, important as those
were, they did not make up the delegates’ list, at least not directly. Rather, the
authors engaged in a type of rhetorical syncopation, changing the expectation
by shifting the emphasis, though not the theme. Although they claimed the
“rights of other citizens,” the first right they listed was “respect.”247 Having
eschewed the more standard form of rights-listing, the Convention instead
asserted that citizenship was first and foremost a matter of social recognition
in civil society. This “right of respect” or “right of recognition” framed the
other rights and reflected the experiences of the members of the Convention
and the people they represented. This was an understanding of rights that

245 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 42.
246 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The Act mentioned rights of contract, property, and access to
courts explicitly. Id. at sec. 1. The right to marry was at the time seen as both an aspect of the right
to contract and as a basic right of freedom right protected through the language of the Act that ensured
the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens.” See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era
Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 276–90 (1999) (discussing
marriage as a recognized right of freedom implemented by the Civil Rights Act and through the
Freedmen’s Bureau); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 24–59 (1998) (noting how
marriage was seen as an aspect of contract rights and exploring complex relationship between
marriage, contract, and labor from the abolitionist movement through Reconstruction); Laura F.
Edwards, “The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of All Our Rights”: The Politics of Slave
Marriages in North Carolina after Emancipation, 14 L. & Hist. Rev. 81, 100–24 (1996) (studying the
legal and political recognition of marriages of formerly enslaved couples in North Carolina during
Reconstruction).
247 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 42.
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fused the basic civil rights traditionally associated with liberty with the social
recognition that was the essence of equality.
Next, the Convention emphasized that “due attention” be given to “our
needs.”248 Again deviating from a more traditional understanding of rights, the
authors here characterize needs as rights. But what did they mean by “needs?”
Although not specified in that paragraph, the preceding list of wrongs
conveyed the content: religion, education, self-government, family, home, the
“products of our labor.”249 All of these would be aspects of the basic elements
of respected citizenship. This was a baseline approach to citizenship that
equated needs-based claims with rights claims. And, although one could
characterize remuneration as one of the needs, the authors said something
slightly different: “proper REWARDS should be given for our services.”250 This
phrase suggests fair payment for labor, but also something more. The dispute
of unequal pay for military service was very much in their minds (it was listed
in the Wrongs), as was the fact that such service had turned the tide of the war.
Service here seems to have meant not just service to individuals through labor
but also service to the nation, and it ties the rewards of service to their other
claims to suffrage and citizenship rights. This point was repeated with the next
clause: “the immunities and privileges of all other citizens and defenders of
the nation’s honor should be conceded to us.”251 This reference to privileges
and immunities, along with a general statement of rights, seems to call on an
encompassing, cultural understanding of the phrase “rights, privileges, and
immunities” a phrase used in previous Black conventions252–rather than a
more precise legal definition. And, by way of emphasizing their point, they
staked a claim to a “fair share” of the public lands—highlighting the ongoing
debates over how much land the formerly enslaved could obtain, work, and
own, an idea to which the Lincoln administration had lent some support.253
The Convention also authored an Address of the Colored National
Convention to the People of the United States.254 That document begins with
248
249
250
251
252
253

1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 42.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.

Id.
See, e.g., supra, text accompanying notes 52–53.
Id. The administration, and especially Treasury Secretary Chase and Secretary of War Stanton, had

supported the use of the Confiscation Acts to enable the freedmen to obtain land and personal
property. See DOUGLAS EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION 98–100 (2014).
254 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 43. There is some confusion over who authored the
Address. The Address is listed in the convention minutes as having been prepared by the Business
Committee, which was chaired by John Mercer Langston. Id. at 16–17, 40. Hugh Davis indicates
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what was a common statement of Black Reconstruction’s foundational
principles: “complete emancipation, enfranchisement, and elevation of our
race[.]”255 The delegates apparently feared some slippage in the Republican
Party’s commitment to abolition (especially after a recent speech by Secretary
of State Seward), so the Address devoted substantial attention to the hypocrisy
of the Union fighting a war to end slavery and then attempting to end the war
by agreeing not to end slavery.256 The delegates argued that such a failure to
end slavery would instead create perpetual war, a point that showed the
underlying radicalism embraced by all Black leaders once the war had begun.
The balance of the Address took up the issue of what next: what would
freedom mean and what beyond abolition was required to see it through? As
was almost always the case for African American speakers of the time, the
Address argued that suffrage was the most important right of freedom. In a
passage that directly confronted the more conservative white argument in favor
of carving apart liberty and citizenship into discrete levels or stages, the
Convention responded with a defense of the primacy of suffrage:
We are asked, even by some Abolitionists, why we cannot be satisfied, for the
present at least, with personal freedom; the right to testify in courts of law; the
right to own, buy, and sell real estate; the right to sue and be sued. We answer,
Because in a republican country, where general suffrage is the rule, personal
liberty, the right to testify in courts of law, the right to hold, buy, and sell
property, and all other rights, become mere privileges, held at the option of
others, where we are excepted from the general political liberty.
257

The Declaration of Wrongs and Rights had intentionally not embraced
the listing of liberal rights such as testimony, contract, and property, as its main
goal; the Address explains why. In a republic founded on popular suffrage,
voting is the main guaranty of all other rights. “Personal liberty” cannot be
preserved, if it can even be realized, without “political liberty.” For Black
people who had lived in the Jim Crow North, this point was especially

that Peter Clark of Cincinnati, who was on the committee, wrote the Address. Davis, supra note 179,
at 20. Philip Foner stated that Frederick Douglass wrote the address. 3 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: THE CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865 49 (Philip S. Foner, ed. 1952). David Blight
describes it as “Douglass’s speech.” BLIGHT, supra note 109, at 441. This confusion highlights one
of the points of this article, which is that there is value in seeing convention materials, and especially
the collectively approved documents, as themselves collective statements.
255 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 43. See also Henry Highland Garnet, “Let the Monster
Perish” sermon delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives, February 12, 1865, published
as A Memorial Discourse by Rev. Henry Highland Garnet [hereinafter Garnet,
Memorial Discourse], at 89 (“Emancipate, Enfranchise, Educate”), https://archive.org/details/memo
rialdiscourse00garn/page/88.
256 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 47–55.
257 Id. at 59.
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important. They knew personally that access to this first level of liberal rights
provided them little guaranty of security, especially as they looked west to
states that excluded free African Americans.258 These delegates also suffered
severe disabilities under Jim Crow laws and customs that restricted their
education, their economic mobility, and their social status and dignity. These
were the claims and complaints that Black delegates had expressed at
numerous conventions throughout the previous thirty years, and when they
wrote in 1864 that rights become “mere privileges, held at the option of
others” they stated not an abstract idea of rights but a lived experience of rights
that were restricted, impeded, and burdened. The right to contract meant far
less for a class of people barred from the legal profession than it did for the
dominant class.
The Address also confronted other aspects of suffrage. There was an
ongoing debate, both within the Black public sphere and more generally,
about whether suffrage was a natural or “conventional” right. While most
Black leaders characterized it as a natural right and therefore essential to
citizenship, some others accepted that it depended on the conventions, habits,
and structures of societies. The Address argued that the debate itself was
moot.259 With Black Americans having fought for liberty and the Union in the
Civil War, they had “fully earned the elective franchise” and white Americans
had “contracted an obligation to grant it.”260 While this difference would
become much more problematic for women’s suffrage in the coming years—
the reliance of Black men on a martial connection to suffrage and full
citizenship would deepen the gender divide between Black male civil rights
claims and women’s suffrage and rights advocates after the War261—for Black
men still fighting and dying in battle, the connection was too plain to not make
a part of their argument.
The ways in which military service influenced the Convention’s
understanding of citizenship also appears in the listing of disabilities which the
delegates suffered as an extension of the slave power’s influence on the nation.
In an extended paragraph the authors listed numerous changes and harms that
they had experienced or foresaw if slavery were not expunged, including harm
258 See generally Litwack, supra note 51.
259 The Address authors clearly favor the natural rights view, calling it implicit in the Declaration of
Independence, and stating that seeing suffrage as conventional places it on an “uncertain foundation.”
1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 57.
260 Id.
261 On the tensions raised between Black male suffrage claims and women’s suffrage claims, see
MARTHA S. JONES, ALL BOUND UP TOGETHER: THE WOMAN QUESTION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN
PUBLIC CULTURE, 1830-1900 140–47 (2007).
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to specific constitutional rights. They feared that this could cause white
Americans to “take the musket from the shoulders of our brave Black soldiers,
deny them the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, exclude them from
the ballot-box,” and deny them free speech “in and out of Congress” and the
“right of peaceably assembling.”262 Given the recent attention by our modern
Supreme Court and legal scholars to Reconstruction-Era views of the right to
bear arms,263 it is interesting here to see not only the direct reference to the
Second Amendment right, but its connection to the arming of soldiers in the
nation’s defense. For these authors writing in wartime, the right to bear arms
was quite precisely connected to the military service of their brethren and to
claims to full citizenship. It is not clear from this context how broadly the right
to bear arms was understood, however. The tight connection made between
the right and the right to serve in the nation’s military may indicate that the
delegates saw the right as more collective than individual, and that they were
not considering it as part of a general right of self-defense. On the other hand,
the fact that it was also closely tied to the right to vote makes it seem more
individualist. But even that interpretation should be tempered by the fact that
each of the rights they discuss—assembly, arms bearing, and voting—were rights
expressed collectively and for the purpose of protecting the safety and rights
of the Black community. Thus, as was the case in the antebellum conventions,
it may be that modern conceptions that see individualist and collectivist rights
as distinct may not very well explain the understanding of nineteenth century
African American leaders.
Another debate taken up in the Address was the question of what
restrictions could fairly be placed on suffrage. For educated, middle-class
African Americans in the north, this question forced them to confront some
of the biases linked to their racial uplift ideology. For instance, as Kate Masur
has noted, African American advocates for Black suffrage in the District of
Columbia in 1866-67 tended to connect the right to vote to the duties of

262 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 47.
263 See e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 847 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
public understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of its ratification in relation to the
right to bear arms). See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866–1876 (1998) (tracing the “adoption of, and .
. . interrelationship between[] the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights legislation passed
during Reconstruction, particularly focusing on the right to keep and bear arms”); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991) (discussing changes in the application
of the Bill of Rights as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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taxpaying and even to property ownership.264 The underlying question, of
course, was whether the achievements of the Black community–property
ownership, taxpaying, military service, education–were being used as proof
that all Black men should have the right to vote on par with white men,
including new immigrants, or whether such indicia of “worth” would
themselves become limits on the right, limits which, even if formally applied
to all voters would still be used to exclude Black men particularly.265 The
Address handled this point with a pragmatic appeal to white Republicans. The
authors argued presciently that the white South would be “characterized by a
sullen hatred towards the National Government. It will be transmitted from
father to son, and will be held by them ‘as sacred animosity.’”266 Treason
defeated in battle will remain under the surface. “[F]or a long time that
country is to be governed with difficulty. We may conquer the Southern
armies by the sword; but it is another thing to conquer Southern hate.”267 The
surest way to retain control of the South, the Address argued, was to “give the
elective franchise to every colored man of the South who is of sane mind, and
has arrived at the age of twenty-one years” and they would have millions of
citizens loyal to the federal government.268 Not only did the delegates at this
Convention anticipate almost precisely the situation in the Reconstruction
South and the eventual policy of Republicans, they also saw the need to
embrace a broad-based suffrage among the destitute freedmen. The question
of what, other than race, would constitute acceptable limits on suffrage without
violating its fundamental nature would continue to trouble Black and white
Republicans during Reconstruction, but the embrace of suffrage by the
Syracuse Convention staked a strong claim to a broadly egalitarian suffrage
principle as Reconstruction began.

264 MASUR, supra note 59, at 131–34. After the war white Republicans actively debated Black suffrage,
and a “qualified” suffrage limited to education or property was seen as a compromise position. Id.
at 139. President Lincoln supported qualified suffrage in his final speech on Reconstruction in April
1865. See LOUIS P. MASUR, LINCOLN’S LAST SPEECH: WARTIME RECONSTRUCTION & THE
CRISIS OF REUNION 9–10 (2015). Masur reprints the speech at pages 189–93. The delegates to the
Syracuse convention would have well understood the dangers of these qualification, having
experienced them in some northern states already, including in New York.
265 On literacy tests as a “reform” movement in the mid- and late-19th century, see ALEXANDER
KEYSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 141–44 (2000). Some advocates for women’s suffrage also advanced the “worth” or
qualifications argument, to the point of producing full-throated racism by leaders such as Elizabeth
Cady Stanton. See, e.g., MASUR, supra note 59, at 178–88 (discussing Stanton and others debating
women’s suffrage and Black male suffrage in D.C.).
266 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 61.
267 Id.
268 Id.
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Finally, the Convention raised some complex social and cultural ideas
about the nature of race prejudice and what that might mean for efforts to
address civil rights. As we saw, the Convention’s Address sought to bridge
the discussions about ending slavery and the growing debates about what
freedom would mean and whether it would include enfranchisement. The
way the Address connected these two points was particularly insightful, and
reveals the sophistication of the delegates in recognizing and trying to manage
American racial dynamics. The Convention wrote:
We have spoken of the existence of powerful reactionary forces arrayed
against us, and of the objects to which they tend. What are these mighty
forces? . . . The first and most powerful is slavery; and the second, which
may be said to be the shadow of slavery, is prejudice against men on account
of their color. The one controls the South, and the other controls the North.
Both are original sources of power, and generate peculiar sentiments, ideas,
and laws concerning us. The agents of these two evil influences are various:
but the chief are, first the Democratic party; and, second, the Republican
party. The Democratic party belongs to slavery; and the Republican party is
largely under the power of prejudice against color. While gratefully
recognizing a vast difference in our favor in the character and composition of
the Republican party, and regarding the accession to power of the Democratic
party as the heaviest calamity that could befall us in the present juncture of
affairs, it cannot, be disguised, that, while that party is our bitterest enemy, and
is positively and actively reactionary, the Republican party is negatively and
passively so in its tendency. What we, have to fear from these two parties,—
looking to the future, and especially to the settlement of our present national
troubles,—is, alas! only too obvious.
269

For the conventions’ delegates in 1864, it was plain that racial prejudice
was part and parcel of slavery: it was, they said, slavery’s shadow. Importantly,
the convention was not speaking only about the remnants of slavery in law,
such as facially oppressive laws like the Black Codes of the South or the Jim
Crow laws of the North, even though these were important concerns for the
delegates. Their point extended to the “sentiments” and “ideas” regarding
race, not just race-based laws. Just what did this mean?
To better understand what they were saying, it helps to also consider a
passage from later in the Address concerning the need for equal laws:
We believe that the highest welfare of this great country will be found in
erasing from its statute-books all enactments discriminating in favor or against
any class of its people, and by establishing one law for the white and colored
people alike. Whatever prejudice and taste may be innocently allowed to do
or to dictate in social and domestic relations, it is plain, that in the matter of

269 Id. at 48–49.
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government, the object of which is the protection and security of human rights,
prejudice should be allowed no voice whatever.
270

How can these passages be reconciled? The first emphasizes that
prejudice is the shadow of slavery, and that its tentacles extend beyond laws
into the ideas and sentiments of the people. Slavery—what Black abolitionists
had long described as a “Monster”271—will continue in America so long as this
shadow covers the sentiments of the people. Yet the second passage seems to
say that prejudice in private lives—“social and domestic relations”—is relatively
innocuous so long as it has no place in law or government. The very idea of
prejudice seems to shift between these passages, full of destructive power in
the first while potentially innocent in the second. Resolving this problem is
important, not only for accurately reading the meaning of the Convention, but
also because the distinction between “political” and “social” rights was
contested ground on which Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction ideas of
civil and citizenship rights were forged.272
There are a couple of ways to harmonize these passages. The second
passage is focused on the importance of removing race prejudice from law and
government, so perhaps the authors were more casual about regulating or
condemning private prejudice. This would explain their reference to
prejudice and taste being “innocently allowed” to affect social and domestic
relations. On this reading, “innocently” could have several possible meanings.
It could mean that the prejudice expressed socially did not imply racial
inferiority but was instead an erroneous but harmless or neutral set of
presumptions about race. Or it could mean that prejudice, even if implying
racial hierarchy, could nonetheless be rendered innocent in effect so long as
it did not affect any position, standing, privilege, or benefit outside of the
immediate relations of the parties (what the authors described as being allowed

270 Id. at 56.
271 See supra, text accompanying note 69.
272 The standard view of rights categories in the mid-nineteenth century is that Congress distinguished
among civil, political, and social rights (and similarly distinguished among civil, political, and social
equality). Civil rights included common law rights like the rights to contract and own property (rights
covered by the 1866 Civil Rights Act); political rights included suffrage, office holding, and jury
service; social rights covered interpersonal and private interactions. See FONER, Reconstruction,
supra note 149, at 231 (noting the distinctions among natural, civil, political, and social rights); JACK
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 222–26 (2011) (outlining the tripartite theory of citizenship). Social
equality was considered to be a personal matter wholly outside legal protection. There is a danger,
however, seeing these categories as fixed or unified. As the discussion in the text here shows, this
was contested ground: Black advocates generally sought to reduce the scope of the social equality
“exemption” and to expand the idea of civil equality and political equality to cover many quasi-private
areas. See, e.g., MASUR, supra note 59, at 161–62, 192–93 (discussing the views of Black leaders on
measures to reduce inequality).
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“no voice whatever”). This second view would mean that the delegates were
willing, from a pragmatic perspective, to concede a certain latitude for white
supremacist feelings in personal contexts, but hoped the elimination of an
operationalized white supremacy would be sufficient to achieve full equality.
This second reading is probably more consistent with the fact that many
African Americans found they needed to speak of race prejudice and equality
in a way that did not trigger white fears of interracial sexual relations, a point
supported by their linking of the “social” with the “domestic”.273
But this still leaves the question of what the authors meant in the first
passage when they asserted the dangers of prejudice in sentiments and ideas.
While it is possible the two passages are simply not compatible and that the
authors expressed two different views about social prejudice, there is value, I
think, in considering a consistency. Notice that they chose the word
“sentiments” here rather than “tastes.” Although sentiment was often used
then, as now, to mean feelings, it also had a particular meaning in the
nineteenth century. 274 Sentiment, when used in a collective or public context,
often meant more than feeling, something more akin to a moral sensibility. It
was collective “right” feeling, not just a personal view and not even an
aggregated public opinion (though it sometimes seems to have been that as
well). This was how the term was used, for instance, in reformist collective
documents called Declarations of Sentiments.275 If this is what the Address
authors intended, then they were speaking to a middle space between the
domestic and the political. This was a space where people formed moral
senses about their fellow humans, and where those senses could be improved
or subverted. The spaces where public sentiments governed, then, would be
the lecture halls, social clubs and meetings, schools, churches, and other
public gatherings that were not expressly political (although they could be) but
273 The opposition to “social equality” was often a thinly veiled metaphor for the white fear of interracial
marriage and sexual relations, and Black speakers were loath to hit this nerve in their white audiences.
On the problematic concept of “social equality” and the unstable categories of equality before and
during Reconstruction, see Kate Masur, Civil, Political, and Social Equality After Lincoln: A
Paradigm and a Problematic, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1399 (2010).
274 On 19th century conceptions of sentiments, see GLENN HENDLER, PUBLIC SENTIMENTS (2001).
275 The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments of 1848 is the best known of such documents. See
Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 176. We also saw such a title used for some
documents in the Black conventions of the 1840s. See, e.g., 1848 National Convention, supra note
150, at 12. And this styling for a collective statement was used by the American Anti-Slavery Society
in its important convention in 1833. See The Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society:
with the Declaration of the National Anti-Slavery Convention at Philadelphia, December, 1833 and
The address to the public, issued by the Executive Committee of the society, in September, 1835 at
6, available at Library of Congress, Digital Collections, Slaves and the Courts, 1740 to 1860,
https://www.loc.gov/item/2001615799/.
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out of which moral sentiment and ideas formed to influence and guide politics,
government, and law. Such spaces were neither public, in our sense of
governmental, nor private, in our sense of personal, familial, or social. These
were the spaces and institutions of civil society, standing between the
governmental and the personal.
Considering that the Convention delegates were themselves meeting in
such a space and that their primary mission was to create a network of
organizations in which such community-building institutions would engage,
educate, and form the newly constituted citizens of their local communities, it
makes sense that they would use this term “sentiment” to convey this public
moral space. Understood this way, the type of prejudice to which the first
passage above refers is not the prejudice of personal relations that affected
sexual relationships, marriage, and friendships, but the public prejudices that
governed access to civil society: barriers to education, the professions,
churches, reformist organizations, labor unions, etc.276 The Convention thus
articulated three spheres, not two: political (governmental and legal), societal
(civil society), and personal (social and domestic). This difference in typology,
and the contest over how to divide and define it, was a pivotal point in the
legal-cultural understanding of civil rights, public/private action, and a range of
other modern concepts.
Through both its organizational/structural achievements in founding a
national Equal Rights League and in its rich public documents, the National
Convention at Syracuse stands as one of the most important events for the
nineteenth century civil rights movement. It was a pivotal transition
convention between the era of abolition and the re-founding of the country
during Reconstruction. The Convention collected some of the key
components of the antebellum Black Convention Movement—its critique of
white supremacy and racial prejudice, its articulation of a substantive, civil
society-based idea of freedom and equality—and refocused it toward a positive
project with the potential to enact some of those ideas and principles through
political, legal, and societal change. And where earlier national conventions
had often failed to extend their influence and projects, the Syracuse
Convention set the stage for an explosion of Black activism across the country.

276 If my reading here is right, churches would have been viewed as more “public” than they are today.
The fact that Charles Sumner’s original Civil Rights Bill included churches as public institutions
should be a clue about this difference in meaning between the public and the private. See CONG.
GLOBE, 42th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1871) (setting out text of Senator Sumner’s bill).
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM: METHOD AND
SUBSTANCE
Up to this point this Article has taken an outside-in approach to
constitutional discourse. I have analyzed the speeches and writings of the
members of the Black Conventions, people who stood outside the legal and
political institutions that created formal constitutional law, to consider their
readings and imaginings of constitutional text and principles. In this section I
want to step back and see what generalizations about constitutional meaning
and method we can identify from this survey of the Black Convention
Movement. In doing so, however, it is helpful to bear in mind that the source
material themselves are not political or legal treatises. These were rhetorical
documents, designed to persuade audiences, sometimes Black communities,
sometimes white communities and legislatures, and most often both. They
were not, therefore, focused on presenting structured legal analysis as one
would see in a judicial opinion or systematic exegesis of law as one would find
in a legal treatise. But this is also why these documents are important: the
discourses evident in public settings, in conventions and meetings and
speeches, reflect a more direct public meaning. They also reveal the ways in
which constitutional discourse covered more than formal law, more even than
formal politics. The ways in which people who were formally excluded from
law-creation engage and conceive of the Constitution tells us things about
constitutionalism that we cannot glean from official texts. Given the
subsequent constitutional, political, and moral embrace of inclusion, it is even
more important that we should take these ideas very seriously. And given that
the very concepts being explored and developed in the Black convention
movement were precisely the ones broadly adopted after the war—despite the
fact that white lawmakers actively refused to adopt them before the war—makes
this particular source of constitutional ideas essential to our constitutional
history, culture, and collective understanding of the text itself. Thus, although
I recognize that my effort here to find some coherence runs the risk of
imposing an order on materials that is not there, in fact, I believe such an effort
is necessary to any historical approach to constitutional meaning that takes
seriously both inclusive equality and constitutional history.
The approaches to the Constitution taken at the Black conventions from
the 1830s to 1865 encompassed ideas ranging from a major
reconceptualization of constitutional history, to arguments about constitutional
methods, to specific claims about the essential elements of a re-founded
constitution that would establish freedom and full citizenship. Together these
ideas reflect an aspirational approach to the Constitution that was
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simultaneously critical and hopeful, an approach that saw the small “c”
constitution of society as a necessary component of capital “C”
Constitutionalism, and one that homed in on the critical aspects of civil society
that were needed to realize freedom and citizenship on the ground. It also
reflected a sophisticated understanding of racial prejudice as a widespread and
dangerous obstacle to freedom and citizenship that required those oppressed
by that prejudice to take active and collective steps to defeat the “monster.”

A. The Conflicted Constitution and a Constitution of Aspiration
For antebellum Black Americans, the Constitution represented a
fundamental contradiction. Simultaneously a protection for racial slavery and
the foundation of a political society dedicated to liberty, the Constitution, like
the country itself, embodied an irresolvable conflict. This point was well
articulated in the Ohio State Convention of 1851, where H. Ford Douglas,
William Day, and Charles Langston debated the legitimacy of the Constitution
and the moral and strategic choices that confronted Black people as they
sought to end slavery and secure equal rights.277 Viewed together, their
positions reveal a complex and layered approach to the Constitution.
As we saw, Douglas set forth the Garrisonian view that took the
Constitution’s protection of slavery at face value, and which saw the
Constitution as comprised of both the text and the interpretations and
applications of text by the ratifiers and by subsequent legislators and judges.278
That Constitution, declared Douglas, enslaved and oppressed African
Americans, was patently immoral, and should not be supported by Black
people through participation in elections or other mechanisms founded on
such an anti-liberty document.279 Day countered that rather than focusing on
the applications or constructions of the text, it was better to look to the text
and its specific language—language that did not mention slavery and that did,
in the Preamble, declare a commitment to justice and general welfare and in
the Fifth Amendment assert its protection of life and liberty.280 Day thus
rejected textual evidence that condoned slavery, as well as later pro-slavery
constructions of the text and the ratifiers’ intentions to protect slavery, resting

277 See supra, Section III. D.
278 Id. See also 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 8 (“I hold, sir, that the Constitution of the
United States is pro-slavery, considered so by those who framed it, and construed to that end ever
since its adoption.”).
279 See 1851 Ohio Convention, supra note 195, at 9 (“Now, I hold, in view of this fact, no colored man
can consistently vote under the United States Constitution.”).
280 Id. at 10.
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his commitment to the Constitution on more general textual evidence and a
more general principle of liberty.281 For his part, Langston set forth a hybrid
position, fully accepting the dismal view of the Constitution and constitutional
law described by Douglas but at the same time viewing the Constitution as a
potential source of protection.282 Langston fully accepted the violence and
oppression enabled by the Constitution and did not shrink from blaming the
document for the support of slavery and racial prejudice. Yet he also
embraced the hopeful Constitution, the idea that with the substantial effort of
Black activists and their white allies there remained a possibility of a new
Constitution—whether through new text or merely new interpretations was not
yet clear—that fully supported liberty and equal rights and rejected racial
slavery.283
In an important sense they were all right. Or, rather, what can be identified
as an African American constitutionalism encompasses all three perspectives.
Indeed it is precisely such multivocality that makes the study of the Black
Conventions so helpful. While it may be tempting to view a single perspective
as the dominant view, or alternatively to reject any attempt to divine a
perspective in the face of disagreement, I suggest that we see the debate here
as a coherent whole. The delegates were not, like a political convention,
representing different and competing interests. They were instead expressing
the views of people with a similar interest—the elimination of slavery and
securing of rights for all Black people. Or, as Langston put it, they sought to
“effect [] our liberties, and secur[e] our political, religious, and intellectual
elevation.”284
This position, I suggest, reflects a Constitution of Aspiration.285 On the one
hand, an aspirational view of the Constitution fully accepts the radical critiques
of the Constitution and its dominant interpretations. Like Douglas and
Langston, it attributes fault to the text itself as well as to the applications of the
text in law and politics. Yet it also sees in the text a counterweight to these

281

See id. (“If [the Constitution] says it was framed to ‘establish justice,’ it, of course, is opposed to
injustice; if it says plainly no person shall be [‘]deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,’—I suppose it means that, and I shall avail myself of the benefit of it.”) (emphasis in
original).
Id. at 11.

282
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 On the idea of the aspirational constitution, see generally Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution,
88 N.W. U. L. REV. 241 (1993); Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1631 (2009); BALKIN, supra note 198.
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flaws in the basic principles expressed in the text, principles that Day
highlighted, such as justice, liberty, and due process.
On this reading the text is, like the Founding itself, ambiguous: it supports
a pro-liberty, human rights view but also a pro-slavery, oppression, and caste
system interpretation. For antebellum Black activists, the struggle was whether
to reject the document, and perhaps the country, or to engage it. Both
Langston and Day, and most members of the conventions, chose engagement.
For them the resolution to the constitutional conflict lay in their own activism,
in their forward-looking efforts to gain political power and change law and
social structures. It was their own activism that would produce a more just
constitution and constitutional practice. The aspirational Constitution was one
that would be made and remade by their own efforts.
The Declaration of Independence played an important role in this
Constitution of Aspiration. As the earliest Black Convention wrote in 1831,
“the truths in the [Declaration] are incontrovertible, and [the Constitution]
guarantees in letter and spirit . . . the rights and immunities of citizenship.”286
They read the documents together, with the rights and privileges of national
citizenship that they believed were part of the Constitution being in “letter and
spirit” an implementation of the truths of equality and rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.287 This was a principle-based idea of
constitutionalism, one in which the ideals expanded the interpretations of text
rather than the text limiting the scope of the ideals. It was a principles-andtext approach to constitutional interpretation.288
But just as the Declaration inspired a principles-based interpretivism, it
also sounded a more radical idea: the Revolution that it represented was still
being fought. This is why Henry Highland Garnet used the Declaration as a
tool of critique, a measuring stick to judge white America’s legal and political
failure. “[T]he declaration was a glorious document,” he thundered, but white
Americans’ cry for “LIBERTY OR DEATH” was hypocrisy, for “[w]hen the
power of Government returned to their hands . . . they [] added new links to
our chains.”289 The Constitution thus measured poorly when judged against
286 1831 National Convention, supra note 13, at 4–5.
287 See supra, text accompanying notes 48–49.
288 By “principles-and-text” I mean to compare this approach to, and distinguish it from, Jack Balkin’s
text-and-principle method. See JACK BALKIN, supra note 269, at 3–20 (2011) (introducing the “text
and principle” theory, which “requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution, and, in
particular, to the rules, standards, and principles stated by the Constitution’s text”).
289 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 4. A more extensive critique of antebellum society
based on the Declaration appears in Frederick Douglass’s great oration, The Meaning of July Fourth

April 2021]

BLACK ABOLITIONISM

339

the glory of the Declaration’s proclamation of equality and liberty. Liberty or
death remained, for Garnet, the appropriate response for Black Americans.
The liberty Revolution was still alive; the Founding was unfinished. For
Garnet, and for an increasing number of leaders in the Black public sphere
through the Civil War, the Declaration, as well as the liberty-affirming portions
of the Constitution, were a source of immanent critique.290 Their
constitutionalism, while certainly a constitutionalism of hope and aspiration,
was itself founded on a method of internal and continuous critique of
constitutionalism itself.291

B. Meaning and Method
What this combination of critique and aspiration produced was a
reformulation of constitutional ideals, including those ideals expressed in
textual forms. This is most apparent in the concept of national citizenship that
was uniformly embraced by the Convention Movement. Even though the
original Constitution contained only a thin statement of citizenship in Article
IV, and even though that had been minimized in legal application, the
Convention Movement embraced citizenship as both national and as rightsbearing. As we saw in the 1831 Convention where the delegates identified the
rights and privileges of citizenship as the constitutional vessel containing the
Declaration’s ideals of equality and liberty, citizenship was taken to have a
substantive content and a national scope.292 It also was a source for the
Constitution to act directly upon citizens, protecting them from invasions of
rights and privileges by both state government and even potentially private (or
more accurately quasi-private) actors. This was a fundamentally radical and
transformative view of the antebellum constitution, one at odds with the
dominant constitutionalism and only loosely tethered to the text, but also one

for the Negro, July 5, 1852.
This speech is widely available, including online
here: https://masshumanities.org/files/programs/douglass/speech_complete.pdf and https://www.the
root.com/what-to-the-slave-is-the-fourth-of-july-1836083536.
290 Immanent critique is a concept developed in modern critical theory. Robert Antonio nicely
described it this way: “Immanent critique attacks social reality from its own standpoint, but at the
same time criticizes the standpoint from the perspective of its historical context.” Robert J. Antonio,

Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx,
and Contemporary Thought, 32 BRIT. J. SOC. 330, 338 (1981).
291 This idea—that African American constitutionalism was both immanent critique and aspirational and
creative—is similar to Derrick Spires’s point about antebellum ideas of citizenship in Black print
culture: “[B]lack theories of citizenship were both critical—defamiliarizing the ostensible naturalness
of what citizenship was becoming—and reparative in their articulation of what might have been and
what could still be.” SPIRES, supra note 10, at 12.
292 See supra, text accompanying notes 47–48.

340

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:2

that would feed into the creation of a textually guarantied national citizenship
during Reconstruction.
The meaning of this newer American citizenship did not, however, rest
upon traditional legal understandings of rights and privileges. Rather, in the
Black conventions we see a more ground-up approach to considering what the
essential aspects of citizenship should be. This is a crucial characteristic of the
type of constitutionalism developed in the Black public sphere during this
period, one that emphasized what could be called the Constitution of Lived
Experience. To understand the scope and possibilities of the particular type
of aspirational constitutionalism of the Black public sphere we need to look at
what the speakers and writers saw as the essential aspects of what they
conceived as full citizenship. This, it turns out, involved multiple activities and
protections across a range of spheres—civil, political, and social.
A thorough exploration of this civil society conception of citizenship is
beyond the scope of this Article, but one can glean the basic contours from
the discussion above of the debates and activities in the Black Conventions.
As we saw, the conventions frequently emphasized education, press,
labor/employment, and suffrage as critical spheres for social participation as
full citizens. Each of these areas was necessary on its own and was also
intertwined with the other areas in ways that could produce a virtuous circle if
all were met and a vicious circle if one or more were abridged. Thus, the
delegates discussed how education, including both basic literacy and skills
education as well as more advanced education, were critical for the elevation
of Black Americans in status, wealth, respectability, and political power.
Similarly, advances in labor and employment, whether in skilled trades in
towns and cities or through landowning agriculture, were fundamental to the
ability of Black Americans to achieve what the 1848 Convention described as
the mutual dependency of independent citizens.293 The development of a
press that could reflect the concerns and interests of African Americans and
that could reach and mobilize Black readers was also seen as essential for the
organization of African Americans in both civil society and as a political force.
Finally, and most significantly, the ability to vote was seen as the single most
important right of citizenship. It was so important that it often was listed with
emancipation as the one of the most essential demands made by conventions.
As the organizers of the pivotal Syracuse Convention of 1864 phrased it in
their general Address, the three demands were “emancipation,

293 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 19.
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enfranchisement, elevation of the race.”294 The Syracuse Convention
discussed “political equality” as the most important right after freedom and
argued the demand was particularly urgent given the massive contributions of
over two hundred thousand African Americans as soldiers.295 And even
though the Convention suggested suffrage was a natural right on par with those
listed in the Declaration, it pragmatically also argued that even as a
“conventional right” the service of Black soldiers made it an obligation of the
government: “we claim to have fully earned the elective franchise; and that
you, the American people, have virtually contracted an obligation to grant it.”296
Then, in a series of rhetorical questions, the Convention drew out the
fundamental nature of suffrage as a basic right:
Are we good enough to use bullets, and not good enough to use ballots? May
we defend rights in time of war, and yet be denied the exercise of those rights
in time of peace? Are we citizens when the nation is in peril, and aliens when
the nation is in safety? . . . May we give our lives, but not our votes, for the
good of the republic? Shall we toil with you to win the prize of free
government, while you alone shall monopolize all its valued privileges?
297

After asserting justice claims for suffrage as a citizenship right, the
Convention then explained why, contrary to the view of many white
Republicans, suffrage was even more important than the then-standard set of
civil rights:
We are asked, even by some Abolitionists, why we cannot be satisfied, for the
present at least, with personal freedom; the right to testify in courts of law; the
right to own, buy, and sell real estate; the right to sue and be sued. We answer,
Because in a republican country, where general suffrage is the rule, personal
liberty, the right to testify in courts of law, the right to hold, buy and sell
property, and all other rights, become mere privileges, held at the option of
others, where we are excepted from the general political liberty.
298

294 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 43. See also Henry Highland Garnet’s riveting sermon
in the hall of Congress to celebrate the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, “Let the Monster
Perish,” in Garnet, Memorial Discourse, supra note 252, at 89 (“Emancipate, Enfranchise,
Educate.”). Garnet was the first African American to deliver a speech in the Capitol building, a
Sunday sermon to a large and interracial audience. See DAVID QUIGLEY, SECOND FOUNDING: NEW
YORK CITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 15–17 (2004);
Henry Highland Garnet, Let The Monster Perish, BLACKPAST, https://www.blackpast.org/africanamerican-history/1865-henry-highland-garnet-let-monster-perish/. Quigley states that Lincoln invited
Garnet to speak, but the original source indicates that the invitation came from the House chaplain
and some Republican members of congress. See Statement of the Elders and Trustees of the
Fifteenth Street Presbyterian Church, March 31, 1865, in Garnet, Memorial Discourse, supra note
253, at 16.
295 1864 National Convention, supra note 107, at 55–56.
296 Id. at 57.
297 Id. at 58.
298 Id. at 59.
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Suffrage, like education, labor, and the press was fundamentally
intertwined with all citizenship rights. Indeed, they argued, it was even more
fundamental since it secured all other rights.299 To lose political power was to
be at risk of losing all one’s basic rights, a fact that Black northerners knew all
too well from their antebellum experiences.
Yet it is also important to see that the Syracuse Convention did not speak
of voting as merely an instrumental right. Rather, they saw suffrage as a key
aspect of the broader social goal of full respect and dignity, or, in the deeply
gendered language of the time, as an expression of “manhood.”300 This idea
of respect and dignity as itself a right, as itself an expression of both equality
and liberty, tied together the different claims made at the conventions. And
while “respectability” has often been described as a relatively conservative goal
of the middle-class Black leaders of that period, we would be wrong to miss its
more radical potential as a claim to a broad-based change to civil society.
Indeed, we see in the Syracuse Convention an argument for freedom and
rights as emphatically not limited to the rights to vote, testify, own property,
and contract, but as a claim for access to a range of activities in civil society.
The Black Convention Movement had been addressing, for many decades,
the problems of exclusion from full citizenship. They had developed an
understanding of the need for access to education, the professions, religious
institutions, and other institutions of civil society, opposing restrictions that
were “civil, political, social, or religious” and “in any manner derogatory to the
universal equality of man.”301 Dignity and respectability were words that
described this more granular understanding of equality as a function of civil
society and not just legal institutions.
Moreover, they argued that the failure to implement this broader equality
and the tendency of white governments to limit equality to the rights of

This position was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court, even if it has not been fully or
consistently honored. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (stating that suffrage is a
“fundamental political right because [it is] preservative of all other rights”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (observing that suffrage “is preservative of other basic civil and political rights”).
The Court has more recently hedged on the “fundamentals” of the right by permitting state actions
that potentially burden the right, see Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181 (2008)
(law mandating photo identification for voter registration is constitutional), and by limiting
congressional power to enforce the right through preclearance, see Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529 (2013) (striking down the preclearance and coverage provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965).
300 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 42.
301 1848 National Convention, supra note 150, at 12.
299

April 2021]

BLACK ABOLITIONISM

343

contract, property, and court access amounted to “nominal freedom.”302 This
was freedom in name only, a formal freedom that masked the actual condition
of continued oppression. As one convention put it, Black northerners in a
Jim Crow society were merely “slaves of the community”; their nominal
freedom to contract and own property and go to court did not prevent them
from being victims of collective oppression.303
This was a deeper
understanding of the problem of equality than was generally discussed in the
dominant sphere, even among white Abolitionists (as the Syracuse Address
pointed out).304 In many ways this analysis anticipated what would happen after
Reconstruction, as formal legal equality became a mask for the full
implementation of Jim Crow across the South and, to a lesser degree, in other
regions as well. The problem of “nominal freedom” was an integral part of
the Black public sphere’s understanding of the meaning of freedom, equality,
and full citizenship.
Black northerners understood the nature of equality and freedom
precisely because they had experienced its denial daily, and had been fighting
so persistently against racial oppression. This is why one of the central points
they also made through this period, a point that became a pivotal aspect of the
Syracuse Convention, was how race prejudice was intimately connected with
racial slavery. It was slavery’s “shadow,” extending the civil death of slavery to
a kind of civil half-life in segregation. All of the disabilities of civil society that
prevented the realization of full citizenship were the result, they argued, of a
foundational racial animus among white northerners—sometimes including
their allies in the abolitionist movement. The reason that they were denied
access to institutions of civil society, despite their status as legal rights-holders,
was due to the extensive reach of the monster that was race prejudice.

302

See, e.g., 1843 National Convention, supra note 102, at 22 (describing the situation of Black

northerners as follows: “the disabilities of the nominally free people of this country flow from slavery,
and that while that heaven-daring system continues, our entire enfranchisement will be retarded.”).
See also MINUTES OF THE STATE CONVENTION OF COLORED CITIZENS, HELD AT ALBANY, ON
THE 18TH, 19TH, AND 20TH OF AUGUST, 1840, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THEIR
POLITICAL CONDITION at 12 (1840) (“[W]e hold the elective franchise as a mighty lever for elevating
in the scale of society any people, and feel sensible that without it, WE are but nominally free, the
vital means of our improvement being paralyzed.”); OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO STATE
CONVENTION OF COLORED FREEMEN: HELD IN COLUMBUS, JANUARY 19TH-21ST, 1853 at 4
(1853) (“[I]n the free states, the colored man is only nominally free.”).
303 1848 National Convention, supra note 151, at 18.
304 See, e.g., 1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 47–49.
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C. Constitutional Directions
This analysis, which we see in the documents from the Black Convention
Movement and which is reflected across a wider range of the speeches, articles,
and other forums of the Black public sphere, carries important implications
for how we should think about the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Even though the Conventions discussed above were not
directly addressing constitutional text and proposals, their general
understanding of race, slavery, citizenship, and civil society suggests significant
lines of inquiry about the Amendments that were adopted. Far more needs
to be done to explore these points, but I will close with some suggestions about
where this African American constitutionalism might lead on some particular
constitutional issues.

1. Thirteenth Amendment as a Civil Rights Amendment
A persistent theme among the antebellum Black Conventions was the idea
that racial prejudice, as experienced outside the slaveholding South, was
merely an extension, or shadow, of slavery itself. African Americans
understood, better than almost all white people (including white abolitionists),
that American slavery was racial, and that white America’s hypocritical efforts
to harmonize slavery and liberty fueled the many-tentacled monster of race
prejudice. Black northerners well knew that escaping formal slavery, slaveryin-law, did not mean the abolition of informal slavery, or what they called
slavery to the community. Thus the Jim Crowism of the North, seen in both
legal segregation and informal customs and practices of segregation and
subordination, were just as much a part of slavery as were the chains that
bound their family and friends to the south.
Ending slavery, therefore, also required ending prejudice. Freedom in a
formal sense of legal abolition was merely nominal freedom, a freedom hardly
worthy of the name. Under this view the abolition of slavery necessarily
implied a commitment to the abolition of prejudice. It required, in the words
of the Syracuse Convention, a change in public sentiments.305 For these
leaders, a constitutional amendment ending slavery was plainly a civil rights
amendment. American slavery was racial slavery, and its end must include the
end of racial prejudice and oppressions. Whereas white congressmen debated

305

1864 National Convention, supra note 124, at 49.
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whether the Amendment authorized congressional legislation on civil rights,306
for the delegates who attended the Syracuse Convention such questions
merely reflected the weak-kneed nature of abolitionist understandings of
American slavery. The abolition of slavery not only permitted the securing of
civil rights, it required it. And what it required was not only the first-order
rights to contract, property, and court access, but a complete elimination of
prejudicial exclusion across civil society. Freedom necessarily included, they
argued, suffrage rights, rights to integrated education, integrated professions,
integrated religious institutions, desegregated public transportation,
desegregated public theaters and inns, and myriad other points of access to
the public sphere and civil society that comprised full freedom.
Thus, at bottom, only a broad reading of the Thirteenth Amendment can
capture this vision of freedom developed in the Black public sphere. Modern
scholars have suggested various versions of this view, including an anti-caste
vision, a labor vision, and an abolitionist vision, among others.307 And while
the precise contours of the meaning of the Amendment would require a
306 Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (“[The Civil Rights Bill] is intended to
give effect to [the Thirteenth Amendment]”) with CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291–92
(1866) (“[T]he enforcement of the bill of rights, touching the life, liberty, and property of every citizen
of the Republic . . . is of the reserved powers of the States.”) and CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1295 (1866) (“Can Congress confer citizenship upon persons who are excluded by the
Constitution? The courts have uniformly decided that negroes are not citizens under the
Constitution.”). See also LASH, supra note 4, at 113–44 (discussing the relationship between debates
over the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment).
307 There have been several excellent recent explorations of the possibilities for developing the much
under-utilized jurisprudence of the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY:
THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 8–12
(Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (exploring abolitionism’s influence on the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (2001) (“To understand the making of the
[Thirteenth] amendment is to understand the fluid interaction between politics, law, and society in
the Civil War era.”); Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697, 1698 (2012) (describing Ashley’s theory of the thirteenth amendment “that addressed the
intersectionality of racial and class-based oppression”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Panel I:
Thirteenth Amendment in Context: The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1459, 1460 (2012) (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment was not limited to the abolishment of
slavery but “cover[s] those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery”) (quoting United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 437 (1989) (arguing that congressional debates on the
thirteenth amendment “contain a . . . rich[] vision of constitutional reform” that encompasses “fair
and just labor relations”). For a caution on these possibilities for doctrinal development, see Jamal
Greene, Panel III: The Limits of Authority: Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1733 (2012). Dorothy Roberts has recently challenged us to connect antislavery abolitionist
constitutionalism to modern prison abolitionism in ways that confront the perceived deficiencies of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Roberts, supra note 1, at 108.
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detailed and extended period of working out—something that the members of
the Black conventions like Charles Langston understood quite well—there
would have been no doubt among Black leaders of the time that legislative and
judicial efforts to implement these ideas of freedom were authorized by a
constitutional commitment to freedom in the first place. There is every reason
to think that this understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment—its text and its
principle—included the power and the duty for state and federal governments
to eliminate all vestiges of race prejudice that affected the liberty and rights of
Black people to be equal, respected citizens in American society.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment, Citizenship, and Access to Civil
Society
If the Thirteenth Amendment included a commitment to full citizenship,
then the Fourteenth Amendment, with its explicit guarantee of citizenship and
its privilege and immunities, was, from the perspective of the Black public
sphere, primarily a re-expression and further reification of this principle. It
was not that the Thirteenth Amendment did not go far enough, but that there
was a danger that white legislators and judges would not follow the
Amendment’s promise. White northerners had, after all, been inclined to see
nominal freedom as enough. They needed a more definite articulation of the
principles to force their hands. This was especially true given the fact that they
faced a future of entrenched resistance to even the most basic ideal of freedom
and racial equality in the postwar South.
Viewed this way, section one of the Fourteenth Amendment becomes a
more detailed exposition of the Thirteenth Amendment’s establishment of
freedom. It is, in a sense, an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, an
explanation of what freedom should mean and how it should be achieved. For
Black Americans reading the language of section one, it would have been
natural to read the words citizenship and privileges as incorporating the very
things Black northerners had been fighting for and discussing in conventions:
education, access to professions, a free press, labor rights, land ownership,
rights to bear arms and military service, among others. For people who lived
the exclusions of segregation, citizenship and its privileges were not only
formal legal statuses but were the stuff of daily experience. In this sense the
Fourteenth Amendment would have implied an obligation for government to
create the framework for full freedom and the elimination of race prejudice,
to constitute, in law and practice, the Constitution’s principles.
Moreover, seeing the Fourteenth Amendment as an exposition of the
thirteenth would mean that the Fourteenth should be understood—
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interpreted—with the ideals of full freedom in mind. Thus, for example,
limitations on the Fourteenth Amendment that restrict it to state action and
thus prevent legislatures or courts from addressing prejudice and segregation
in non-governmental civil society would be plainly erroneous.308 As we saw
with the Black Convention Movement, much of the means of implementing
segregation and the denial of freedom occurred in the non-governmental
public sphere. Achieving full citizenship and its respectability required
addressing the sentiments of prejudice across civil society. This is simply
impossible under a strict state action limitation.
Indeed, the judicial
imposition of a state action doctrine was a key component in the rejuvenation
of Jim Crow at the end of Reconstruction, something that was all too familiar
to people who had lived through both. The binary of the public-private
distinction makes little sense if one sees freedom the way African Americans
described it in the nineteenth century. This is not to say that there would be
no distinctions at all—as we saw, the Syracuse Convention recognized
distinctions between the public sentiments affecting civil society and the
personal prejudices that presented no barriers to the social spheres of power
and dignity. Such a civil society view of citizenship might well accept a range
of regulations and relationships. It would not, however, see state action as an
acceptable line.

3. Suffrage as a Fundamental Right
If a form of constitutionalism based in the Black public sphere would see
the Fourteenth Amendment as an explication of the thirteenth, then it
certainly would see the Fifteenth Amendment as the embodiment of the
principle that suffrage was the most critical right of freedom and full
citizenship. From this perspective, suffrage was already a right guaranteed by
the Thirteenth Amendment (as a component of freedom) and the Fourteenth
(as a basic privilege of citizenship). The Fifteenth Amendment was, like the
Fourteenth, a further articulation of the commitment to freedom and equality.
Unlike the dominant view among white Republicans, who temporized on
Black suffrage during the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, Black
leaders had seen suffrage as an essential right of citizenship since at least the
1830s.
308 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“[Fourteenth Amendment] nullifies and makes
void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States.”). On the problems of the state action doctrine, see the still classic
article by Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. L. REV. 503 (1985).
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The Black public sphere’s emphasis on voting as the pivotal right arguably
would require rethinking current constitutional law. While the Supreme
Court has at times regarded the right to vote as fundamental, it has also taken
a light hand when faced with voting restrictions, such as voter ID requirements,
felon disenfranchisement, limited polling locations, and other mechanisms
that are justified as protecting against chimeric claims of voter fraud.309 A
constitutionalism more deeply informed by the nineteenth-century Black
public sphere would re-orient the prioritization of voting rights, requiring both
a presumption against restrictive voting laws and a stronger burden to justify
restrictions. This would be especially true for restrictions that had
disproportionate effects on racial minorities, since the purpose of securing
suffrage with the Fifteenth Amendment was to counter antebellum-style
barriers to suffrage based on race. Otherwise suffrage rights become another
form of nominal freedom, which Black leaders consistently exposed and
opposed. Finally, this view of voting as fundamental could also impose a duty
on government to make voting widely accessible in the same way that there
would be a governmental duty to ensure that all citizens have access to
education.

4. Race Consciousness and Equality
The problem of race-specific organizations and policies presented difficult
questions for Black leaders at the antebellum conventions. Ultimately,
however, the Black conventions recognized the importance of Black
organizations—the conventions themselves, the Black press, Black schools,
Black churches. Henry Garnet and others emphasized that the reason raceconscious organizations were necessary was precisely because the dominant
white public had imposed racial oppression on African Americans: it was
oppression, not race, that required such organizations. This was also true for
the Black press. The conventions recognized that without a press run by and
focused on African Americans, any effort they made to achieve equality could
be thwarted by the dominant white press.
Legal scholars and courts have struggled with the question of whether race
consciousness—in the form of affirmative action—is consistent with Fourteenth

309 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181 (2008) (requiring Indiana voters
to provide photographic identification is constitutional). See also Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to
Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 143 (2008) (arguing that Crawford
exemplifies the Supreme Court’s “inconsistent” jurisprudence on the right to vote).
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Amendment originalism.310 The fact that members of the Black public sphere
also struggled with the question of race consciousness shows how important
and intrinsically complex the issue was and is, pitting the ideal of full racial
equality against the reality of racial oppression. Yet the experience and
discussion of Black leaders is instructive. As discussed above, the particular
approach to constitutionalism developed in the Black public sphere of that
period embraced a fundamental contradiction between ideals of liberty and
the reality of slavery and race prejudice. As an aspirational constitutionalism
it was at heart a constitutionalism that refused to ignore either the ideal or the
reality, instead seeking a dynamic relationship between the two through which
activists could progress toward a further implementation on the ground of the
ideal principles.
That is precisely how they saw race consciousness. For these leaders and
activists, Black organizations were absolutely essential to the process of
achieving equality, racial improvement, and uplift. Given the fact of white
supremacy and its complex influence on white society across all regions of the
country, it simply was not possible to approach the end of slavery and
elimination of racial prejudice without acknowledging and supporting race
conscious Black organizations. Because race prejudice extended throughout
the social sphere, a nominal color-blindness would not solve the problems of
racial slavery any more than the mere legal end of slavery would actually end
the effects of racial slavery. This is not to say that color-blindness was not a
goal. To the contrary, one of the key demands of Black leaders in this period
was the elimination of the word “white” from all statutes. But they also
recognized the need for African American organization to develop, express,
and advocate on behalf of the interests of Black communities. Thus, even
though they admired and supported the interracial work of William Garrison
in The Liberator, they also worked to support presses and papers run by Black
editors. The need for such organization ultimately came down to a question
of how far the reality of racial equality and progress was from the ideal of equal
liberty, and no doubt such questions were and would remain complex and

310 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 71, 72 (2014) (arguing that affirmative action is not supported by an originalist understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (contending that legislative history is
“dispositive” of the affirmative action debate); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427,
427 (1997) (suggesting that race-consciousness was a basis for Congressional statutes passed in the
1860s); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 477 (1998) (“The vogue for originalism in constitutional
theory and the Constitution’s condemnation of race-conscious laws lie in uneasy tension.”).
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fraught with differing views. But it was also true that the measure for whether
race consciousness was still necessary was ultimately not the abstract form of
colorblindness in law but the actual condition of African Americans on the
ground in their access to spheres of power, whether political, economic, social,
or religious. And that is a lesson we continue to work to understand.
CONCLUSION
Answering Eric Foner’s call “to find ways to get the voice of African
Americans into discussions of the Amendment’s original meaning, scope, and
limitations” will take a great deal of time and effort. 311 It calls for the sort of
interdisciplinary work that historians and law scholars can do very well but
which often confronts problems of disciplinary fit and division. The history
of nineteenth-century African American freedom struggles does not provide
neatly tailored answers to questions of constitutional meaning of the sort that
judges, lawyers, and some legal scholars seem determined to find or create.
Yet that history, and the role of African Americans in forging the very text that
reconfigured our Constitution and constitutional commitments, should not be
prevented from providing meaning to modern constitutional law simply
because it is not as readily accessible as is an antebellum court opinion or an
extended speech in the Congressional Globe. As the debates and documents
of the Black Convention Movement show, perspectives on the antebellum
Constitution within communities of free African Americans were varied, and
ideas of how one could change the constitution—both in text and in on-theground enactments—were significant in the development of African American
political and legal ideals. As the nation moved toward ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments—a ratification, in the case of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, only possible through the participation of Black male
voters in the South—these ideas forged in the antebellum freedom struggle
became important sources for how to understand and implement the broad
concepts of liberty, equality, and citizenship embraced by the newly-minted
text. Those ideas still speak to us across time, if we can learn how to hear
them.

311 Eric Foner, Remarks at the Conference on the Second Founding, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1289, 1290
(2008).

